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Part I: Love in Berlioz and Shakespearei 
A love that cannot be symbolized 
The popular perception of Berlioz’s idea of love is perhaps encapsulated by an Internet meme 
which imagines the author of the Symphonie fantastique addressing a message to his beloved 
in the manner of a 2012 pop song: “Hey, I just met you, and this is crazy, but here’s a 
symphony about me overdosing on opium and murdering you, so marry me maybe.”1 The 
intoxicating fancy of that symphony’s program is certainly an eye-catching opening to most 
listeners’ acquaintance with Berlioz, as it has been since 1830: it seems to espouse an attitude 
towards love that is utterly at odds with the way our generally, thankfully, more mundane 
world goes. But it is not necessarily entirely representative of his way of thinking, and it is 
arguably rather through his lifelong engagement with Shakespeare—an obsession already 
driving the Symphonie fantastique through the idée fixe of the Shakespearean actress, Harriet 
Smithson2 —that Berlioz developed his most fascinating thoughts on the nature of romantic 
love and its essential contribution to the construction of individual human subjects.  
Although themes of love feature in some way in much of his music, Berlioz’s engagement 
with Shakespeare—and the development of his most distinctive thoughts on love—can be 
seen most clearly in his more expansive treatments, the “dramatic symphony” Roméo et 
Juliette (1839) and the opera Béatrice et Bénédict (1860–62), which is the principal focus of 
this essay. In both plays, casting off words is an abiding concern. That is to say that the 
escape from language, from the symbolic order, is the central goal. In the case of Romeo and 
Juliet, the words to shed are the names “Montague” and “Capulet,” which cause the young 
lovers pain. Plays have a particular problem in evading the symbolic order, since it is in 
language that they are expressed, but a musical setting can dispense with them, and in his No. 
3, the love scene, Berlioz presents the retreat of the symbolic order literally on stage: the 
movement opens with revelers leaving the Capulet ball, singing goodnight to each other and 
exchanging a retreating series of cheerful sounds which, however, signify nothing: 
“tralalala!” That done, the symbolic order of language disappears. Alone, the lovers do not 
have to do as Shakespeare’s do, and attempt to argue their symbolic away: for a moment here, 
as again in their moment of death, they do genuinely experience a life and a love beyond its 
grip.  
In his setting of Much Ado, too, though in a less direct way, Berlioz dwells on this notion of 
the escape from language—or more specifically the way that ideas of love are, to put it in 
Lacanian idiom, “quilted” by the linguistic sign marriage. The “quilting point,” which 
radically reconfigures the symbolic, is like the moment in a mystery novel when a collection 
of clues which could mean almost anything—“a wisp of rubber and a small object made of 
wood”—receive their correct interpretation: it was the investigating policeman whodunit! The 
detective here is as witty, as clever, as Beatrice is when Benedick upbraids her for wordplay: 
                                                      
1 The meme can be seen at http://www.quickmeme.com/crazy-berlioz/. The song, “Call Me Maybe,” 
by Carly Rae Jespen, has a chorus with the lyrics: “Hey, I just met you, | And this is crazy, | But 
here’s my number, | So call me, maybe?” 
2 Shakespeare is brought into the narrative even more strongly in the symphony’s “sequel,” Le 
Retour à la vie, which ends with a fantasy overture on The Tempest. 
“Thou has frighted the word out of his right sense, so forcible is thy wit.”3 In this moment the 
floating signifiers are fixed by a new quilting point: the bit of rubber can no longer be thought 
to be part of a washing-up glove, an elastic band, or a condom, but can only be the remnant of 
a joke balloon which was used to create a “scream” that would suggest that the victim was 
alive later than he in fact was, and so reveal the identity of the murderer.4  
In Roméo et Juliette, then, the lovers seek an impossible resolution in the constitutive 
“outside” of the symbolic order which they cannot personally escape: it is a resolution in a 
point “beyond interpellation,” as Mladen Dolar names the space outside of ideological 
configurations. “Could one say that love is what we find beyond interpellation?”, he asks, and 
although it is this question which Roméo et Juliette first clarifies in a direct sense, it resonates 
much more widely through Berlioz’s entire output.5  
Locating the particular in the universal 
It is important to note immediately that a vision of love “beyond interpellation” does not 
equate to the post-sexual revolution, “anything goes” attitude. The claim of a number of 
contemporary theorists is that the “anything goes” conception is a product of late capitalism, 
an insistence that we should be free to choose from a smorgasbord of sexual activities, to 
which new identities and perversions can be added at any time, without any of them being 
considered more “universal” than any other (the choice between options is free, but there is 
no freedom not to choose). According to what the philosopher Alain Badiou calls “democratic 
materialist” logic, which is to say the ideology of the West since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
our sexual universe has in this way dispensed with its “tonic” key, so to speak (the musical 
metaphor is his), leading to “a deep desire for atony.”  
One of the orientations of Anglo-American gender studies advocates the 
abolition of the woman/man polarity, considered as one of the instances—if not 
the very source—of the major metaphysical dualisms (being and appearing, one 
and multiple, same and other, etc.). To “deconstruct” sexual difference as a 
binary opposition, to replace it with a quasi-continuous multiple of constructions 
of gender—this is the ideal of a sexuality finally freed from metaphysics. [… But] 
this infinite gradation […] does nothing but uphold, in the element of sex, the 
founding axiom of democratic materialism: there are only bodies and languages, 
there is no truth.6  
Badiou explicitly does not dispute the multiplicity of forms of love (same-sex, opposite-sex, 
intergenerational, etc.), but he denies the liberal claim that, in a world of so many voices, 
none can be “universalized”: the claim that there are only bodies and languages, only points 
of view, no “truth,” no totality to be discerned in it. For Badiou, however it is presented, each 
instance of love is potentially universalizable in the sense that, irrespective of the identity of 
its participants, its coordinates can map an uncharted world for any of its witnesses. We do 
not need to share the race, gender, or age of a “Two” (Badiou’s term for a truth-bearing 
                                                      
3 Much Ado About Nothing, 5.2.50–1. All line references in this article are to Stanley Wells et al., 
eds., The Complete Works, 2 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005). 
4 The example here is taken from Agatha Christie’s mystery novel, Hercule Poirot’s Christmas 
(1935). My apologies to anyone who might have been planning to read it. 
5 Mladen Dolar, “Beyond interpellation,” Qui parle 6, no. 2 (1993), 87. Dolar’s answer to this 
question is ultimately affirmative: “love is one of the mechanisms” for achieving the escape from 
symbolic limitations (ibid., 92). This conviction is also a driving force of the current essay. 
6 Alain Badiou, Logics of Worlds: Being and Event, 2, trans. Alberto Toscano (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2009), 420–21. 
relationship of love) in order to respond directly to the truth that their love presents to us. 7 
His claim is not that the love of a fictional or real-life Two is immortal, but that love itself, the 
love we all experience, qua truth, has a certain “excess over itself”: rather than simply 
providing joy for two people, it amounts to “the creation of a world” which has a universal 
truth-giving function.8  
The particularities of Béatrice et Bénédict, Berlioz’s setting of Shakespeare’s greatest paean 
to the conventional marital model of love, seem unpromising as the basis for the kind of 
radical, universalizable love of a Two that Badiou has in mind. It seems, at first blush, rather 
a conventional work, and perhaps the lack of critical interest in the opera is partly a result of a 
sense that it is ultimately trifling stuff—D. Kern Holoman calls it a “bonbon,” being “light 
and funny, one long essay in triplets and triple meters and guitars and the other joys of Italy, 
dominated from the opening bars by scherzo-like music.”9 Hugh Macdonald is much of the 
same mind: “this short opera is anything but problematical or puzzling.”10 I want to suggest, 
by contrast, that although it is certainly not as consistently rewarding, musically, as Les 
Troyens, its treatment of the theme of love makes it more serious than it might appear. One 
clue to this seriousness is indicated by perhaps the greatest of his many recastings of 
Shakespeare. To the best of my knowledge, nobody has yet considered this change to be 
worthy of comment, but in the opera’s closing moments, Béatrice and Bénédict effect a 
resolution to G major by singing together: 
So let us adore each other and, whatever they say, 
Be mad for a moment! 
Let's love! 
I sense that my pride is resigned to this misfortune. 
Sure of hating each other, let's take hands! 
Yes, for today the truce is signed; 
We'll return to being enemies tomorrow.11  
The assembled crowd echo their “demain, demain!” in five measures of pure G major, and 
then in eight quicksilver measures—and two further G-major cadences—the opera is over. 
Shakespeare too ends with a note of returning violence “tomorrow”: a messenger enters and 
announces that the villain Don John has been captured and brought back for judgement, and 
Benedick replies: “Think not on him till tomorrow, I’ll devise thee brave punishments for him. 
Strike up, pipers” (5.4.126–7; the stage direction “Dance, and exeunt” follows immediately in 
5.4.128). But the violence here is external to the marriage ceremony, a narrative necessity, 
and a social one too, since the villain must be seen to be punished within the confines of the 
play, even if that is only to be in the play’s “tomorrow.” By contrast, the promised violence in 
Berlioz’s opera is internal to the marriage, a return to war. The implication of all this is that 
this dramatic consummation is no more an outbreaking of peace than a football match in no-
man’s-land was around Christmas 1914.  
                                                      
7 Badiou actually gives the privileged position in his exposition of love’s relation to truth to 
Berlioz’s Les Troyens in his “Amorous example: from Virgil to Berlioz,” in ibid., 28–33. 
8 ibid., 30. 
9 D. Kern Holoman, Berlioz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 551 and 540. 
10 Hugh Macdonald, Berlioz (London: Dent, 1982), 183. The only significant extended scholarship 
on the opera is still Julian Rushton, “Berlioz’s swan-song: towards a criticism of ‘Béatrice et 
Bénédict’,” Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association 109 (1982). 
11 “Adorons-nous donc, et quoi qu’on en dise, | Un instant soyons fous! | Aimons-nous! | Je sense à 
ce malheur ma fierté résigné. | Sûrs de nous haïr, donnons-nous la main! | Oui, pour aujourd’hui la 
trêve est signée; | Nous redeviendrons ennemis demain.” 
Are these final words simply a joke, or should we take them seriously? It might seem an odd 
question. Does anyone really believe that marriage will be entirely without fighting? Is it not 
commonplace for ministers and friends to advise bride and groom to expect this, sagely and 
humorously, on their wedding day? Yes, of course. But while the conventional notion of 
marriage can certainly bear the idea that skirmishes will arise from time to time to blight its 
calm, that antagonism is, crucially, not celebrated as the principal glory of the relationship: it 
is only borne as something which the positive aspects of marriage can ultimately triumph over, 
to ensure a lifelong, overwhelmingly pacific and comforting union. So perhaps it is a joke: 
Béatrice and Bénédict are just saying that they will be back to fighting tomorrow, and the 
crowd are just humoring them. The audience is certainly already in the mood for jokes, since 
this is a very funny play (though the opera is less so), and it seems natural that we should 
judge the lovers’ earlier scorn for love to have been self-deluding jest. “But what if we do not 
dismiss their own words?”, Stephen Greenblatt asks in another context (to which I shall in 
due course return).12 Putting the matter in the most skeptical terms, suppose that there is at the 
very least a small possibility that this is meant seriously, that this concluding “joke” is an 
“excess” to their relationship in the sense in which the truth of love is a universalizing excess 
to the Two of Badiou’s philosophy. Proceeding from this skeptical beginning, I should like to 
entertain the possibility that Berlioz’s lovers are faking their marital promises today but will 
genuinely return to their “merry war of words,” a rejection of marriage, on a “tomorrow” 
which, by their own exultant testimony, the crowd is also looking forward to. If this surmise 
is to underpin a compelling interpretation of Berlioz’s idea of love in Béatrice et Bénédict, we 
shall require some collateral evidence. But it is not hard to find, unless we are of a mind to 
altogether ignore some deeply moving, all-too-human psychological suffering expressed in 
the music along the way. To prepare the ground for a judgement on Berlioz’s conclusion, it is 
necessary (in Part I) to tease out the cultural themes and psychological implications of the 
play he chose to adapt. Ultimately, by reflecting on different forms of violence in the play and 
opera, the argument will turn to Shakespeare’s and Berlioz’s radically different engagements 
with the “fundamental fantasy,” Lacan’s theory of the human subject’s relation to a fantasized 
lost object which is supposed to inhere in the socio-cultural big Other, before turning to an 
extended analysis of the music (in Part II); but as an initial step, I shall examine the extent to 
which the marriages in Much Ado and Béatrice et Bénédict, and critical responses to them, 
frame the difference between convention and resistance in social relations. 
Convention, resistance, and surplus-jouissance in Much Ado About Nothing 
Of the two plots in Shakespeare’s play, one—that concerning the slandering of a virtuous 
lady—is derived from his sources (principally Ariosto and Bandello), and one—that 
concerning two scorners of love who subsequently succumb to its conventional expression in 
marriage—is original (although, if we exclude the breathless comic expression of it in 
Shakespeare, which is a big exclusion, Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde may be counted a 
source).13 Berlioz was not alone in finding the second story, that concerning Beatrice and 
Benedick, the more interesting of the two, and the fact that it was more “authentically 
Shakespearean” doubtless added to its Romantic attraction. Julian Rushton suggests that, 
since the full scenario Berlioz wrote in 1852, which bears little relation to the completed 
opera, also has little space for Hero and Claudio, we may conclude that he never had any 
interest in what twentieth-century criticism has tended to consider the “main” plot. 14 
Superficially this is certainly true: the tale of the chaste woman wrongly accused did not 
                                                      
12 Stephen Greenblatt, “Introduction to ‘Much Ado About Nothing’,” ed. Stephen Greenblatt, et al. 
(New York: Norton, 2008), 1412. 
13 See Charles T. Prouty, The Sources of ‘Much Ado about Nothing’. A Critical Study, Together with 
the Text of Peter Beverley's ‘Ariodanto’ and ‘Ieneura’. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950). 
14 Rushton, “Berlioz’s swan-song,” 107. 
suggest itself to Berlioz as an interesting idea for dramatic realization. Yet Hero, like Beatrice, 
has a crucially enhanced role in Berlioz’s hands, as an embodiment of the fantasy of marital 
bliss—unburdened of its traumatic preliminaries—that Beatrice and Benedick are, in 
Shakespeare, ultimately expected to enjoy. In order to keep Shakespeare’s and Berlioz’s 
importantly different characters differentiated in the following discussion in the simplest way, 
I shall refer to them respectively as Beatrice and Béatrice, Benedick and Bénédict, Hero and 
Héro wherever possible. 
If convention is the watchword of the Hero and Claudio relationship, then—at least until they 
are successfully tricked into desiring marriage—resistance is the watchword for Beatrice and 
Benedick. There is never any doubt that they are sexually attracted to each other: from the 
start they confess, either to others or themselves, precisely that.15 But despite being attracted 
to one another, both are passionately committed to remaining legally single (or, in other 
words, they may not wish to remain chaste, but they certainly wish to remain celibate). The 
final victory of convention, which all but the most restless sexual revolutionaries in the 
audience are happy to celebrate, is confirmed by the only explicit instruction in a Shakespeare 
play for a general dance of the company, the dance being a “symbol of order,” and 
specifically that of marriage, “society’s divinely-sanctioned means of controlling and 
directing sexual relations.” 16  Benedick finally silences Beatrice with a kiss, after her 
insistence—softened by a joke—that “I yield upon great persuasion, and partly to save your 
life, for I was told you were in a consumption” (5.4.94–6). Except that he does not: as the 
third Arden edition makes clear, the line “(kissing her) Peace, I will stop your mouth” (5.4.97) 
does not belong to Benedick. The magic of Shakespeare’s comedy is at work even on 
“objective” scholarship. 
The speech prefix and the stage direction […] are another instance of gratuitous 
emendation by Shakespeare’s editors, who for centuries have agreed that the line 
must belong to Benedick and be accompanied by a kiss, despite the fact that both 
the Quarto and the Folio editions of the play assign the line to Leonato and make 
no mention of a kiss. […] The original attribution of the line to Leonato could 
hardly be more appropriate, given the comedy’s consistent concern with 
estrangement and dispossession. The restoration of that attribution and the loss 
of Benedick’s kiss make the line more disturbing, but not as disturbing as the 
compulsion to twist the original text to fit the sentimental assumptions the 
comedy is bent on contesting.17  
                                                      
15 When Claudio asks him for his opinion of Hero’s beauty, Benedick replies that her cousin, 
Beatrice, “exceeds her as much in beauty as the first of May doth the last of December” (1.1.181–
2); at the costume ball Beatrice quips to Benedick, whom she affects not to recognize, “I am sure 
he [Benedick] is in the fleet. I would he had boarded me” (2.1.132–3), with “boarded” meaning 
both attacked, as if she were a ship, as well as sexually penetrated. She expresses to Don Pedro a 
dislike the thought of sex with Benedick, but only because it could lead to pregnancy: when Don 
Pedro says that in her abuse she has “put him down,” she turns his innocent remark smutty by 
quipping: “So I would not he should do me, my lord, lest I should prove the mother of fools” 
(2.1.266–7). Physical attraction, for Benedick, and sexual desire, for Beatrice, are at the core of 
their sparring relationship. 
16 J. R. Mulryne, ed. Much Ado About Nothing (Woodbury, NY: Barron’s Educational Series, 1965), 
24. 
17 Kiernan Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 
192. Claire McEachern, the Arden editor, takes a very different view: the restoration of the line to 
Leonato “provides for a more egalitarian accommodation between the lovers than would 
Benedick’s own declaration of intent to silence Beatrice, an egalitarianism which is in keeping 
with the tenor of their relationship throughout” (Claire McEachern, ed. Much Ado About Nothing 
(London: Arden, 2006), 316.). The misattribution to Benedick is carried over into Larouche’s 
By this stage, any readers, members of the audience, or even editors who consider themselves 
to be deeply critical of the institution of marriage will probably experience a pleasantly 
discomfiting sensation familiar to viewers of Hitchcock’s Psycho. In that film, when the car 
containing the murdered body of Marion Crane stops for a moment as it is sinking into the 
bog, a flash of fear crosses Norman Bates’s face. He looks nervously behind him. Without 
thinking, the audience feels an access of tension. “Sink, for goodness sake!” The car 
obligingly sinks fully into the bog. The tension is released, and we realize that just for a 
moment we have sympathized with someone who is covering up a murder (even if we do not 
yet know that it is his). For naive receivers of Shakespeare’s play who suspend their 
opposition to marriage in order to enjoy the blissful conclusion of his play, as for viewers of 
Psycho who (presumably, in the main) do not approve of murder, this suspension of a 
habitual ideological or moral commitment is easy to perform: this is “just art,” not ideology, 
and the way that it can encourage us to step outside of ourselves and reach a more informed 
view of our own prejudices is one of its more valuable qualities. Yet in such cases, the 
receiver is the victim of manipulation: we should not be blind to the ideological work being 
done. 
But there are other accounts of Much Ado’s transition from the opening tension between 
convention and rebellion to the unanimous submission to marriage at the end. On the first 
account, relatively socially conservative, marriage is beyond question a good thing. From the 
second, feminist perspective, marriage per se is an efficient tool of patriarchal authority, 
regulating the exogamous exchange of women (a father sells his goods to a husband, to the 
general good of community cohesion and the perpetuation of economic and social power for 
men), but it can be revolutionized in such a way that, this economic element being removed 
and certain freedoms for women being built in, it becomes something that even cynics can 
valorize.18 For Charles T. Prouty, an example of the first kind of scholar (the “old historicist” 
or “formalist” kind), what marks the couples apart is not so much a different attitude towards 
the attraction of marriage as a formal hallmark of a loving relationship, but rather their 
contrary views of the content of that marital bond. Significantly, he designates both attitudes, 
since both ultimately fail to question the institution of marriage, “realistic.” 
As Hero and Claudio represent one aspect of realism, so Benedick and Beatrice 
represent another. The former follow the way of the world where marriages are 
arranged by patrons or parents in contrast with the idyllic unions which literary 
convention followed exclusively. On the other hand Benedick and Beatrice are 
interested in an emotion which is real and a relationship based on reality instead 
of convention. […] For one couple, love is a business arrangement, for the other, 
a real emotion. But the play is not a drame à thèse, it is essentially high comedy 
wherein the frailty of human pretensions is humorously revealed.19  
                                                                                                                                                            
translation, which Berlioz used. 
18 Marriage was the critical moment of disempowerment for Elizabethan women: “English women 
were not under the full range of crushing constraints that afflicted women in some countries in 
Europe. Foreign visitors were struck by their relative freedom, as shown, for example, by the fact 
that respectable women could venture unchaperoned into the streets and attend the theater. Single 
women, whether widowed or unmarried, could, if they were of full age, inherit and administer land, 
make a will, sign a contract, possess property, sue and be sued, without a male guardian or proxy. 
But married women had no such rights under the common law” (Stephen Greenblatt, “General 
introduction,” in The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, et al. (New York: Norton, 2008), 
10., my italics). 
19 Prouty, The Sources of ‘Much Ado about Nothing’. A Critical Study, Together with the Text of 
Peter Beverley's ‘Ariodanto’ and ‘Ieneura’. 63. For Léonato, the commitment to marriage, by 
whomever, is not as “realistic” as it is for Prouty. Straight after Héro and Claudio are married, in 
Claire McEachern, an example of the second kind of scholar (the “new historicist” kind), also 
draws attention to the conventionality of both couples, but focuses specifically on the 
seventeenth-century context in which it should be understood, rather than assuming (as 
Prouty does) a universality to the institution of marriage. McEachern suggests that Beatrice 
and Benedick put on the conventional pose of shrew and misogynist “as a form of disguise or 
protective camouflage, or as a defence against the greater conventionality of being lovelorn 
[…] Overall these gender stereotypes come across as rather archly staged roles; we can sense 
Shakespeare’s nod to the conventional postures, but also his mockery of them.”20 McEachern 
elaborates the view that even the Hero and Claudio relationship is a putatively feminist 
revision by Shakespeare of his sources. In Ariosto’s presentation of the equivalent marriage 
there is a clear sense of economic exchange between the father and prospective husband—an 
element which Prouty sees retained in the reshaping by Shakespeare—but McEachern 
suggests that the equivalence of Leonato’s and Claudio’s social status invalidates a purely 
economic reading of the union, and that the evidence of genuine love between the couple 
demonstrates Shakespeare’s gentle critique of his society’s conventional views of marriage.21 
For her, the Beatrice and Benedick relationship is even more admirable: rather than being 
tricked into marriage by the cunning of their friends, “an alternative vision might find the two 
in full possession of their own emotions, having united over and beyond the ways in which 
their community has prompted them.”22  
In essence, and despite their differences of motivation, these arguments amount to the claim 
that the two plots trace two different routes to similar ends, with marriage either being beyond 
question a good thing (Prouty) or good even for feminist critics like McEachern on account of 
its redefinition by Shakespeare (the idea that the radical comic redrawing makes possible a 
marriage model entirely freed from patriarchal exogamous exchange, and thus a positive 
feminist prospect). Both arguments depend on a fundamental sympathy for the institution of 
marriage, but again the skeptic will point out that even in the carefully nuanced reading of 
McEachern, the implication is that ultimate capitulation to the social pressure to enter into 
that institution is fine as long as there was some initial resistance.  
The two positions I have been discussing can be given the Lacanian terms “fool” and 
“knave.”23 The “knave” has no problem with the existing order of things, and uses its mere 
existence as an argument in its favor—or, more usually, as sufficient grounds to avoid 
bringing the existing order into question at all. The category of knaves includes scholars, or 
members of the public with an interest in art, who express a distaste for theory. Terry 
Eagleton’s rejoinder exposes the unreasonable nature of this objection: “No layperson opens a 
botany textbook and shuts it with an irascible bang if they do not understand it straight away. 
Since art and culture are at least as complex as the life of plants, it would be strange if talk 
                                                                                                                                                            
another of Berlioz’s interesting interpolations, here to the spoken dialogue between Nos. 13 and 14 
(New Berlioz Edition (hereafter NBE) 3, 270), the friar tells Léonato that he has been asked to 
prepare a second contract (“J’ai été requis pour préparer un deuxième contrat; le voici”). Léonato 
asks who here feels drawn by the fantasy of marriage (“Qui se sentirait ici la fantaisie de se 
marier?”). I shall return to this point. 
20 Claire McEachern, “Introduction,” in Much Ado About Nothing, ed. Claire McEachern (London: 
Arden, 2006), 35. 
21 See Claire McEachern, “Fathering herself: a source study of Shakespeare’s feminism,” 
Shakespeare Quarterly 39, no. 3 (1988). 
22 McEachern, McEachern, “Introduction,” 50. 
23 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959–60, trans. Dennis Porter, vol. 7, The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan  (New York: Norton, 1992), 179–90. 
about them were any more instantly comprehensible.”24 But the knavish position is a socially 
and politically conservative as well as an intellectually insufficient one: knaves quickly mock 
any Leftist critique of prevailing practices or conditions as “utopian,” and cheerfully play up 
their knavishness by appealing, in the final analysis, to simple or brute “reality” (in the same 
way that they appeal to “plain English” rather than the “jargon” of theory). When he 
witnessed millions marching against war in Iraq on a visit to London, President George W. 
Bush demonstrated exemplary knavish credentials by collapsing that “utopianism” into 
“reality” by saying (in Slavoj Žižek’s paraphrase): “You see, this is what we are fighting for: 
so that what people are doing here—protesting against their government policy—will be 
possible also in Iraq!”25 In a very limited sense, insofar as he does not question marriage as a 
cultural form, Prouty occupies the position of the “knave.”26 The “fool,” by contrast, kicks up 
a public fuss about the faults or deliberate deceptions of the existing social, cultural, 
economic, and political forms, but in a self-undermining way. An example of what I mean is 
the satirist, whose apparently aggressive denunciations of the status quo are enfeebled by their 
comic delivery. One of the most prominent of late-twentieth-century satirists in Britain, Peter 
Cook, encapsulated this sardonically when he opened his Establishment Club in Soho in 1961: 
he was modeling it, he said, on “those wonderful Berlin cabarets which did so much to stop 
the rise of Hitler and prevent the outbreak of the Second World War.”27  
The crucial difference to bear in mind here is that between the content and the position of an 
enunciation. So, when the graffiti artist Banksy produced the opening titles to an episode of 
The Simpsons, aired on Rupert Murdoch’s Fox TV, the content of his enunciation was clearly 
an acerbically anti-corporate message: we cut away from the normal title sequence to a dark 
factory environment where masses of dispirited workers paint the cartoon’s colorful images 
and make clothing, cuddly toys, and other Simpsons memorabilia, amid skeletons of child 
workers who have died at their work. But the position of enunciation is, first, in the opening 
title sequence of a comedy show that is shortly going to make the viewer feel good, and 
second, on Rupert Murdoch’s own television network. Even without the exaggerations in his 
critique, which have the effect of implying that the whole thing is just a joke (cuddly toys are 
stuffed with the feathers of birds killed for the purpose; a sorrowful unicorn punches out the 
holes in the center of CDs with his horn), the position of enunciation translates the message 
into something like: “I’m not such a bad guy after all: see, I can take even the most obscene 
criticism like this on the chin. I might seem like a monstrosity but I’m really just your cuddly 
uncle Rupert.”28  
What “fool” and “knave” share is what Žižek calls a “libidinal profit, the ‘surplus-enjoyment’, 
which sustains the two positions.”29 The surplus is generated by converting pain to pleasure, 
for instance by President Bush converting a million voices raised in anger and opposition into 
a self-serving vision of friendly support, or by Banksy converting the grim knowledge, which 
we all share, of the real means by which Western consumer goods are made, into a finger-
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wagging critique. It makes the sympathetic receiver feel both that they are on the moral high 
ground and that somebody is “sticking it to the man,” without actually achieving any change 
at all; in other words, it provides the “hysterical satisfaction of snatching a little piece of 
jouissance away from the Master.”30 The particular style of feminist argument adopted by 
McEachern and others, which has the effect of demonstrating how Shakespeare articulates 
and then critiques a patriarchal bias, does not threaten seriously to harm the prevailing 
ideology; by contrast, it increases the receiver’s appreciation of the artwork, by providing 
surplus-jouissance. This is why both knave and fool ultimately support the prevailing cultural 
form. It is a contention of this essay that in Béatrice et Bénédict Berlioz avoids this, but in 
order to see how this is achieved the argument must be taken beyond new-historical readings 
of Much Ado, as useful as they are in bringing Renaissance ideology into focus, for the simple 
reason that such readings tend to downplay the potency of modes of resistance. 
Three kinds of violence in the story 
Žižek distinguishes three forms of violence which are useful guides to clarifying the themes 
of both Much Ado and Béatrice et Bénédict.31 The first, subjective violence, is the familiar sort 
of physical violence, represented right at the start of the play and opera by the war from 
which the principal men have returned victorious (celebration of this victory provides the text 
for the choral No. 2 in the opera). The second kind, symbolic violence, is the violence of 
language. Although I shall have much more to say about the psychology of this violence, 
suffice it to say that most immediately, symbolic violence manifests as the “merry war 
betwixt Signior Benedick and [Beatrice]” in Shakespeare (1.1.59), which Berlioz’s spoken 
text calls, rather nicely, a war of epigrams (“une guerre d’épigrammes”; NBE 3, 59). It is, 
importantly, also evinced by the violence done to Claudio and Hero, and potentially all of 
Messinan society, by the slanders of Don John. The third, systemic violence, is the means by 
which a system of economics, politics, culture, society, and so on, enables its own smooth 
function. It is a violence of proxies and purblindness, of centrally taken decisions having 
powerful effects on remote individuals, or of cultural norms without a clear origin and no 
single human Master (the cultural investment in marriage, for instance) exercising diffuse but 
massive and ubiquitous pressure that punishes lack of conformity with the threat of at least 
making the miscreant a pariah, and at most doing subjective violence to them. 
The transition from the first to the second form of violence in Much Ado is superbly traced by 
A. D. Nuttall, in a study which returns to the early twentieth-century humanist tradition of 
Shakespeare scholarship.32 Nuttall sees the “merry war” as both a significant transformation 
of Benedick’s existence heretofore and also the kind of relationship that can only be 
expressed, at least in what we might call its pupate form, in terms of war. Already by Act 1 
scene i, Nuttall claims that “Beatrice is now as important as—more important than—the war 
from which [Benedick] has recently emerged. […] In the courtly love literature of the Middle 
Ages the language of knightly service was re-applied in the sphere of courtship. But 
Benedick’s ‘I am engag’d’ [to Beatrice, when she confirms her belief that Claudio has 
wronged Hero] is neither Ovidian nor courtly. It is absolute commitment—faith—expressed 
in the language of a world he has lost forever.”33 This is perceptive, and the sense that the 
transition is quickly effected is enhanced by Shakespeare’s attentive control of bellicose 
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language (here closely followed by Berlioz in Act 1 scene iii, NBE 3, 59).34 In Shakespeare, it 
is in fact fair to say that the war between Beatrice and Benedick is over as soon as it appears 
before us. As Nuttall observes, Beatrice’s expression of curiosity in the fate of “Signor 
Mountanto” betrays her interest in his safety, and although she carps “I wonder that you will 
still be talking, Signor Benedick. Nobody marks you,” (1.1.110–11) at least one person is 
marking (noticing) him: Beatrice herself. The pair are, then, “electrically aware of each other 
from the start,”35 and their bickering reflects a universal quality in most humans (here, we 
verge on knavish “realism”). Comparing the bickering between Beatrice and Benedick to the 
verbal abuse flung between teenagers “with much laughter,” or the commonplace indication 
“g.s.o.h.” (good sense of humor) in personal ads, as evidence of a symbolically violent pupal 
stage of courtship, Nuttall finally relates their posturing more generally to certain kinds of 
flirtatious lovers in a winning image. The way Shakespeare presents his scornful lovers is 
“shrewd social observation. It is as if baiting and merriment serve a useful purpose in the 
preliminary phase of courtship but can become counter-productive if they harden into a fixed 
habit. […] It has to be possible for the parties to move out of this bantering, this careful 
sparring at arm’s length, if the union it all serves is ever to be attained. It is hard to make 
complicated jokes and to kiss at the same time.”36  
This is persuasive, but in being swept up by the charming nature of his argument it is 
important not to miss the fact that while Nuttall may be right about the tendency of some 
(though certainly not all) flirtatious behavior to depend on raillery, he fails to establish that 
marriage is, specifically, the logical next stage. Certainly joking must stop for kissing to 
begin, but only the most absurdly sententious would insist on marriage as a preliminary to 
that. Yet this easy slippage, from an acknowledgement that the baiting “must” come to an end 
to an unwitting acceptance of the cultural pressure to marry, is by no means demonstrated by 
Nuttall’s argument. Rather, in accepting the logic of the kiss there is a risk that we let the 
more arbitrary normative pressure to marry to slip in by the back door as a “realistic” 
consequence. To return for a moment to Berlioz’s concluding promise that the “truce” is only 
temporary, it is obvious that this idea, but not the idea of marriage, could sit comfortably with 
Nuttall’s proposition. Kissing—to be understood synechdochically for sex—may happen on 
and off, being separated by long periods of antagonism which may even serve to sharpen the 
desire for the kiss: the fighting, being the basis of the relationship, is what makes it edgy and 
sexy. Indeed, Beatrice and Benedick have been on intimate terms before, and the sexual 
frisson between them in the course of the play is perhaps a reprise of the foreplay to an 
unseen earlier trysting truce. But while marriage can “realistically” cope with the occasional 
bunfight, its basic form is peaceful, its basic expression loving. One model therefore gives 
symbolic violence a heightened erotic charge; the other draws social comfort from “realistic” 
systemic violence. 
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The difference in the relationship between Beatrice/Benedick and Béatrice/Bénédict rests 
primarily on the final outcome of a tug-of-war between symbolic and systemic violence, and 
secondarily on the balance of the three different kinds of violence in the respective artwork. 
Shakespeare’s presentation is more stable than Berlioz’s, which is to say that the relation 
between forms of violence at the beginning is restored at the end. The first scene is full of 
(mostly) subjective-violent references to “war, plague, betrayal, heresy, burning at the stake, 
blinding, hanging, spying, poisoning,” and we return to subjective violence at the end, with 
Benedick’s last words of judgement on the villain Don John: “Think not on him till tomorrow, 
I’ll devise thee brave punishments for him. Strike up, pipers” (5.4.126–7).37 As Nuttall 
demonstrates, the main body of the play is dominated by the symbolic violence that Beatrice 
and Benedick do, ultimately only as Lacanian “fools,” to the conventions of marriage: far 
from harming the institution, their pointing out of its flaws is not even enough to prevent 
them—let alone anyone else—from joining in. Hero and Claudio, meanwhile, are beset by 
their own symbolic violence, Don John’s linguistic assertion, through false testimony, that 
Hero has betrayed Claudio. If systemic violence is the guardian angel of the conventional 
lovers, then it is too, by implication, for Beatrice and Benedick: this is the congenial violence 
of the police, the English bobby’s rubber truncheon—a violence we support because it 
protects us from harm. If Beatrice and Benedick use their squabbling to conceal their love for 
each other, then rather than being tricked out of their resistance to marriage by the systemic 
violence of social convention, they simply have the veil lifted from their eyes by it.38 Much 
Ado’s forms of violence are therefore held in an equilibrium which maintains the status quo: 
subjective violence is kept to a minimum (this is a comedy, after all), symbolic violence can 
provide tension (Don John) and delight (Beatrice and Benedick), and systemic violence (the 
pressure to marry) is benign and to be desired by all. 
At this point Berlioz’s conception evinces a stark differentiation from his source. First there is 
the target of the violence that will come “tomorrow,” and the form it takes. For Shakespeare, 
it is subjective violence to the villain, whereas for Berlioz it is symbolic violence done to the 
institution of marriage, which cannot tolerate continuous war as its essential condition 
(though, as I shall note once more, it makes good use of the idea of struggle as a temporary 
blemish within the “normal” bliss). Let us attend to Shakespeare first, to understand what 
Berlioz transforms. Don John is the aberrant element in Messinan society, the malign force 
that is, more or less, its only imperfection. Much Ado stresses two important elements of his 
structural function in that society: first, that his opposition to its dominant cultural forms 
cannot be tolerated (he must be expelled or destroyed), and second that his opposition to 
those forms, while expressed entirely without humor and with a baleful potential, is 
essentially laughable (which is why the idiot policeman, Dogberry, can uncover his plot). 
Since Don John’s attempt to ruin the marriage between Hero and Claudio is simply an 
obscene inversion of the scornful banter of Beatrice and Benedick, the success of their 
opposition is likewise doomed:39 though it is laughable here in a very direct way, the 
implications of their symbolic violence are comparable to his: “What we glimpse in the 
symbolic murder of Hero is not only the malign power of slander, but also the aggressive 
potential of even polite or playful speech. The ‘merry war’ between Beatrice and Benedick 
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leaves scars.”40 Don John’s fate is also directly related to theirs, and their subjection to 
systemic pressure means that they can at last be accepted rather than ejected by their society.  
The figure that Don John represents is found in every society, and in analyzing its ideological 
function as a kind of social glue that works in the moment that it is identified and picked off, 
Giorgio Agamben calls it homo sacer.41 Contemporary examples include caricatures like the 
banker who does not pay his taxes or the benefits “scrounger” who lives luxuriously on tax-
payer handouts (these being caricatures of Left and Right respectively). Homo sacer is any 
one of a number of monstrous elements whose presumed character delimits the “proper,” 
“natural” function of society, and whose erasure from the public space is the mechanism 
which guarantees the smooth function of the social order. Sometimes homo sacer is put to 
death in reality, but at other times a symbolic death will do: it is enough to effect an exclusion 
from accepted public, political space, a monstering, a rejection of the validity of any of the 
individual’s claims. Beatrice and Benedick certainly do not face death if they reject marriage, 
but it is the threat of symbolic death, which would throw them “between the two deaths,” 
which spurs them to accept it:  
The force that pushes them towards declarations of love and hence toward 
marriage vows is as much hearing themselves criticized by their friends as 
hearing that the other is desperately in love. “Can this be true?” asks Beatrice, 
her ears burning. “Stand I condemned for pride and scorn so much?” (3.1.108–
09). “I hear how I am censured,” Benedick declares, resolving that he “must not 
seem proud” [2.3.214, 218].42  
As so often with new-historical studies, Greenblatt’s reading here is essentially Foucauldian. 
The ideological pressure to marry, represented by “scorn” and “censure,” is here internalized, 
and has no need of an external agent. This echoes Foucault’s famous description of the 
Panopticon, whose function is “to induce in the inmate the state of conscious and permanent 
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”43 On the Foucauldian view, the 
awareness that they could be watched is enough to do the watching: there is no need for a 
prison guard to actually be present because the subject will do the repression by him- or 
herself. But while the internalization of ideology is certainly an important source of its power, 
this reading should be supplemented by Althusser’s concept of the Repressive State 
Apparatus (RSA).44 It is only through the very real threat of physical violence at the hands of 
the police, army, etc. that we are all compelled to internalize our ideological injunctions and 
interpellate, in Althusser’s sense, as ideological subjects. These RSAs are our own local Don 
Pedros and Benedicks, which we have recently seen active in putting down student protests 
against rising tuition fees in the UK. Far from the amiable constable on the beat with his 
truncheon, helping old ladies to cross roads, the modern reality of ideological policing is 
made plain by its tendency to “kettle” protestors into a restricted space and then charge at 
them with horses. The structural equivalence of Don John and Beatrice and Benedick is 
therefore a nontrivial fact. The bastard brother stands as an example of what the repressive 
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material expression of violence will be, when it conjoins systemic and subjective violence to 
repress the symbolic violence of protest. In The Taming of the Shrew, in many ways an 
essential background to Much Ado, this subjective violence is actually staged in the brutal 
treatment of Kate. It takes an excess of subjective violence, such as Shakespeare provides in 
the rape of Lucrece, to constitute a truly effective critique of “both marriage and government 
that works to no one’s advantage, not the husband’s and not, in the end, the tyrant’s.”45 The 
material reality should not, then, be overlooked. The institution of marriage can bear a lot of 
violence, as long as it is systemic and subjective. It is symbolic violence that poses problems. 
Their capitulation in the face of extreme odds—Foucauldian nonmaterial scorn and censure, 
and with it the implied threat of Althusserian material violence—means that what Beatrice 
and Benedick seemed, at the start of the play, to offer by way of an original vision of how two 
people can relate intimately without giving in to the generalized pressure to wed, has by the 
play’s conclusion entirely evaporated, because they, along with interpreters who put the 
safety catch on their verbal firearms, call an amnesty on subjective violence. Starting with a 
question that I have already quoted, Stephen Greenblatt brings the play down to ideological 
reality by focusing on precisely this disarming of their language. Although, once more, he 
reads as a new historicist for symbolic rather than material effects, the suppressed material 
consequences are by now clear. 
But what if we do not dismiss their own words? What if we take the conspiracy 
against them seriously? Beatrice and Benedick would not in that case “love” 
each other from the start; it would not at all be clear that they love each other at 
the close. They are tricked into marriage against their hearts; without the 
pressure that moves them to professions of love, they would have remained 
unmarried. Beatrice and Benedick constantly tantalize us with the possibility of 
an identity quite different from that of Claudio and Hero, an identity deliberately 
fashioned to resist the constant pressure of society. But that pressure finally 
prevails. Marriage is a social conspiracy.46  
McEachern considers this “unduly cynical,”47 but Kiernan Ryan’s reading, broadly the same 
as Greenblatt’s, is probably more immediately persuasive for the skeptic, because it takes the 
sting out of Don Pedro’s trickery and stresses instead the fact that this relationship is a 
potentially universalizable instance of the repressed reality of the nature of falling in love—
and one which tends to lead individuals to a misapprehension of their own selves. 
It would be absurd to overstress the sinister side of the trick played on Beatrice 
and Benedick, when the spirit in which it’s played is so patently benign, but it 
would be remiss not to give it due weight too. After all, the net that’s spread for 
them, the net in which their lives become irrevocably entangled, is a web of 
fabrication that makes them misconstrue not only each other but also themselves. 
The gulling of Beatrice and Benedick grants the audience an estranged, 
disillusioned view of the phenomenon of falling in love. What’s usually viewed 
as a subjective, authentic, spontaneous experience is dramatically objectified as a 
culturally enforced fiction.48  
Ryan’s reading, the most fully worked-out of recent studies, is also the most psychologically 
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suggestive and consequently very important for my own reading. I shall return to it shortly, 
but already one can see how Berlioz’s promise of a return, “tomorrow,” to symbolic violence 
may effect a transformation of the tale’s relation to this culturally enforced fiction.49 I have 
already mentioned that Shakespeare balances the forms of violence in his play by concluding 
with the subjective violence with which he began, and allowing the systemic violence of 
marriage to contain (literally, in the central 90-odd percent of the play) the “good” and “bad” 
symbolic violence of the comic and villainous characters. Berlioz does not attempt this neat 
balance, but instead tips the scales to challenge the hegemonic position of the big Other, 
which is upheld by systemic violence. Berlioz never introduces Shakespeare’s homo sacer, 
Don John, and in so doing achieves two remarkable effects. First, he makes impossible Much 
Ado’s feint of presenting Don John as the excremental element, the wicked obverse of 
Beatrice’s and Benedick’s resistance, which can distract us from the fact that they too are 
homines sacri for their opposition to marriage. This excision leaves Berlioz’s viewers no 
option but to locate the split in society within the big Other itself, at the heart of its fantasies 
of “the real goal” of love, marriage. Berlioz’s violence, like Shakespeare’s, turns back from 
the systemic violence of the marriage ceremony, but only so far as to the symbolic violence of 
Béatrice’s and Bénédict’s promise to end their “truce.” In so doing he redoubles that symbolic 
violence, and makes it, in effect, violent enough to pose a realistic threat to the hegemonic 
balance of violence. The second effect of the removal of Don John is that, by removing the 
“dark side” of symbolic violence, figured in the bastard,50 Berlioz increases our sympathy for 
it: we are more free in Berlioz than in Shakespeare to sympathize with Béatrice and 
Bénédict’s resistance to marriage, even if we are pro-marriage members of the audience 
(which is a neat reversal of Shakespeare). There is still manipulation in the exuberant joy at 
the end of Berlioz’s opera—only it is in the opposite direction to that in Much Ado. The 
potential for such an alternative joyful ending is already presented in Beatrice’s warning to 
Hero that if love is directed through marriage it will lead inevitably to sorrow. Her chosen 
metaphor is the dance:  
For hear me, Hero, wooing, wedding, and repenting is as a Scotch jig, a measure, 
and a cinquepace. The first suit is hot and hasty, like a Scotch jig—and full as 
fantastical; the wedding mannerly modest, as a measure, full of state and 
ancientry. And then comes repentance, and with his bad legs falls into the 
cinquepace faster and faster till he sink into his grave.51  
Why must society insist on moving from the jig to the measure, while denying the 
inevitability of the cinquepace? Why not just stop with the jig? For Shakespeare’s audiences, 
the clown’s jig at the end of a play provides a necessary erotic supplement to the relative lack 
of tactility of Shakespeare’s lovers on-stage: “the jig represents the physical consummation 
that follows” the marriage which ends his comedies.52 So, where Shakespeare requires the 
excessive subjective violence of rape (in The Rape of Lucrece) to besmirch the ideological 
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function of marriage, Berlioz creates the infinitely more promising prospect that symbolic 
violence can create a new cultural possibility, a love based on the rejection of marriage, a love 
that sees no reason to stop jigging. In a sense, Berlioz simply returns us at the end of his opera 
to the state of flirtatious sexual tension between Béatrice and Bénédict that we witness at the 
start, and holds out the possibility of a sequel, More Ado About Nothing, in which more 
verbal resistance leads to more sexual tension and more release in the social catharsis of 
marriage. But this begins to look nothing like marriage as conventionally understood.53  
The fundamental fantasy’s new clothes 
A frequently encountered criticism of new historicism and cultural materialism, now the 
intellectual orthodoxies of Renaissance literary criticism, is that they seem to reduce 
Shakespeare to the status of a mere mirror of Elizabethan ideology, or else a tool for exposing 
ideological fault-lines in our own world, with the aim of trying to effect discursive change 
today. But already George Bernard Shaw explained, in hilariously antibardolatrous terms, 
why this criticism entirely misses the point.54 He takes critics to task who fall for “the main 
pretension in Much Ado […] that Benedick and Beatrice are exquisitely witty and amusing 
persons.”55 What such critics fail to realize is the burden of the eleventh item in Shaw’s 
twelve-point credo on Shakespeare, namely “that Shakespear’s [sic] power lies in his 
enormous command of word-music, which gives fascination to his most blackguardly 
repartees and sublimity to his hollowest platitudes.”56 In his review of Much Ado, Shaw 
suggests that, starved of this “word-music,” the play “becomes what Don Giovanni or Die 
Zauberflöte would become if Mozart’s music were burnt and the libretto alone preserved.”57 
He proves his point by acting-out the creation of word-music of his own. 
When a flower-girl tells a coster to hold his jaw, for nobody is listening to him, 
and he retorts, “Oh, youre [sic] there, are you, you beauty?” they reproduce the 
wit of Beatrice and Benedick exactly. But put it this way. “I wonder that you will 
still be talking, Signior Benedick: nobody marks you.” “What! my dear Lady 
Disdain, are you yet living?” You are miles away from coster-land at once. 
When I tell you that Benedick and the coster are equally poor in thought, 
Beatrice and the flower-girl equally vulgar in repartee, you reply that I might as 
well tell you that a nightingale’s love is no higher than a cat’s. Which is exactly 
what I do tell you, though the nightingale is the better musician.58  
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The strong implication is that Shakespeare’s “word-music” does little more than speciously 
beautify banausic communication; it is both brilliant and disingenous. 59  Disingenuous, 
because what Shaw conceals here, of course, is that if you remove the music of Shakespeare, 
you do not end up with Don Giovanni’s libretto; you end up with Shakespeare’s sources (and 
in the case of Beatrice and Benedick, who are original creations, that means silence). In 
praising his skill as a “musician,” Shaw is praising Shakespeare’s skill as the thing we take 
him to be: an alchemical playwright who turned the rubbish of his day to pure gold. But his 
observation is brilliant too, because he puts a finger on Shakespeare’s ability to clothe the 
commonplaces of his day—which are just as often ideological as they are “witty”—in a 
verbal costume that makes us forget, if we are not careful, what is being covered over. Shaw’s 
own nightingale and cat image itself attempts to cover over what it points to: Aesop’s fable of 
the hawk and nightingale (perhaps coming to Shaw by way of the Russian fabulist Ivan 
Krylov, who like him substitutes a cat for the hawk).60 In that fable, the nightingale offers to 
sing to the hawk to save its life, but the hawk—lacking artistic ability but exercising far 
greater subjectively violent power as big Other—decides that it can do without the music but 
not without its food. Shakespeare the nightingale might well be a better musician than the 
costermongers of his day, hawking their ideological moonshine, but their vacuity ultimately 
has a greater force and therefore arbitrary authority than his word-music, and will swallow it 
whole—as we see it does to Beatrice and Benedick. For that reason, attending to the style of 
the clothing that Shakespeare chooses, as Shaw invites us to do by example, is a highly 
revealing activity. Shakespeare neither mirrors nor entirely resists Elizabethan ideology in 
such a way that we can access the “meaning” that his word-music presents. Like Freud’s 
analysis of dreams or Marx’s of commodities, “the ‘secret’ to be unveiled through analysis is 
not the content hidden by the form (the form of commodities, the form of dreams) but, on the 
contrary, the ‘secret’ of this form itself,” the mere fact that his word-music refashions 
costermonger chatter.61  
Ryan spins a virtuoso reading of Much Ado’s talk of “fashion” from an opening observation 
that the famous “ghost” characters of the play—those evidently existing in a previous version 
and named in the first Quarto stage direction but never appearing in the text or action of the 
play—actually “make manifest the covert ghostliness of the play’s substantive characters. 
They betray the immateriality of what passes for existence in the alienated world of Much 
Ado About Nothing.”62 The essence of Ryan’s argument is that clothing that immateriality is 
what gives the characters form, and “fashion” is the work’s crucial image for the process of 
ideological interpellation.63  
                                                      
59 It is, incidentally, in essence the accusation that Abbate levels at musical hermeneutics (in Carolyn 
Abbate, “Music—Drastic Or Gnostic?,” Critical Inquiry 30, no. 3 (2004)): she claims that 
hermeneutics says something banal that “sticks” to music, which, through its transcendent beauty, 
makes the utterance seem more significant. Abbate disapproves, but is this not one of the points of 
music, and a reason why some of us write about it? At its deepest, music says things we can 
scarcely imagine; but even at its least original it utters truisms, which we mere critics can decode, 
and it does so beautifully. The problem is not at all with the banality of the “meaning” glimpsed by 
the hermeneutist (ideological messages are often extremely banal); the problem is with the 
ideology, and the more banal the decoded “message,” the more easily the significance of it is 
downplayed. 
60 The fable is no. 4 in the Perry Index of Aesop. See Aesop's Fables (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). For the Krylov, see Ivan Andreevich Krylov, Russian Fables of Ivan 
Krylov, trans. Bernard Pares (Harmondsworth and New York: Penguin, 1942). 
61 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (reprint, London and New York: Verso, 2008), 3. 
62 Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies, 165. 
63 Jean E. Howard argues for a connection between Shakespeare’s presentation of excess or 
The word serves in Much Ado as a shorthand for the myriad ways in which 
human beings are formed and deformed, physically, mentally and emotionally, 
by the culture in which they find themselves at a particular moment in history. 
“Fashion” is the ideal term for this onerous task, because in its routine sartorial 
sense it’s the most obvious, graphic proof of how tightly people are defined by 
their world and time. By the same token, however, the wider connotations of the 
word imply that the subtler, unseen ways in which the self is unwittingly 
fashioned may be just as extraneous and disposable as an ill-fitting, outdated 
doublet and hose.64  
Fashions change, and the tectonic plates of ideology shift. Beatrice and Benedick get ready to 
slip on their wedding weeds by the end of the play, but in Berlioz’s historical moment, the 
material reality of marriage—the cloth it is cut from as well as its real-world phenomenal 
contents—is very different. One obvious divergence between late-sixteenth- and nineteenth-
century conceptions of marriage, which has a profound effect on their fantasmatic content, is 
the shift in attitudes towards adultery. Much Ado is littered with cuckoldry gags—perhaps 
only The Merry Wives of Windsor has more—starting with Benedick’s response to the first 
mention of marriage and ending with his last piece of advice to Don Pedro. To channel Shaw 
for a moment, it is clear that nobody would be charmed if he said “Time for you to get 
married now, Don Pedro: come on, we’re all doing it,” but he has better words: “Prince, thou 
art sad, get thee a wife, get thee a wife. There is no staff more reverend than one tipped with 
horn” (5.4.121–3). The first sentence is sweetly put, and the second adds a disarming joke, 
which covers up the ideological text: “hurry up and get married, and afterwards, cuckolded!” 
(this connection between marriage and cuckoldry is of course established by the first cuckold 
joke of the play).  
Elizabethan audiences clearly found the figure of the cuckold a riotously funny one, largely 
because he flatters the audience that they are cleverer than the characters on stage: “he 
provides a spectacle of ignorance that allows omniscience on the part of his audience.”65 The 
other ideological benefit of the cuckold is that he sustains the fantasy that marriage offers the 
only legitimate frame for lifelong sexual pleasure. The cuckold is guilty of both blindness to 
his wife’s infidelity and of the cause of that infidelity—his lack of attentiveness to her sexual 
needs—and is punished for both failings; the wife and the second man, meanwhile, are 
punished for their lasciviousness by losing the respect of the community. This trio therefore 
props up an essential part of the fantasy of marriage. Berlioz retains one reference to 
cuckoldry in his opera (in his version of the “That a woman conceived me is true” speech, set 
in the No. 5 Trio), but it has a period feel.66 Béatrice et Bénédict, written 1860–62, emerged in 
the immediate aftermath of Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1856), which destroyed not only the 
old figure of the cuckold but, more pertinently, the generalized idea of adultery as it was at 
that time fantasmatically constructed.67 Adultery stood then, as it stands still, as an officially 
                                                                                                                                                            
mutability in dress and contemporary anti-theatrical tracts which link this both to social 
subversiveness and to the perceived flaws in women: see Howard, “Renaissance anti-theatricality 
and the politics of gender and rank in Much Ado About Nothing.” 
64 Ryan, Shakespeare’s Comedies, 169. 
65 McEachern, “Introduction,” 48. 
66 For the first 22 measures of this section, the orchestra virtually drops out of accompanying 
Bénédict for this outburst of misogyny—as if it is embarrassed to support him. Only piano flutes 
and clarinets, and an occasional flutter from the first violins, provide meagre encouragement. This 
is an important moment in the opera’s structure, and I return to it in more detail below. 
67 Berlioz corresponded with Flaubert, and probably met him, at least as early as 1862, and while 
there is no evidence that he read Madame Bovary, it seems likely that he did—or at least that he 
discountenanced form of sexual pleasure. It may appear to be more thrilling than the familiar 
everydayness of marriage, but its participants are either punished for their wrongdoing or 
come to their senses and abandon it, as in the film Brief Encounter, to return to the security 
and sanctity of marriage. Adultery therefore acts as a psychological guarantee of the rightness 
of marriage. But Bovary’s adultery undermines this fantasy quite brilliantly, as Žižek 
perceives. 
Flaubert took a crucial step in undermining the co-ordinates of the transgressive 
notion of love. That is to say: why was Madame Bovary dragged to court? Not, 
as is usually claimed, because it portrays the irresistible charm of adultery, and 
thus undermines the basis of bourgeois sexual morality. Madame Bovary, rather, 
inverts the standard formula of the popular novel, in which the adulterous lovers 
are punished at the end for their transgressive enjoyment: in this kind of novel, 
of course, the final punishment (mortal illness, exclusion from society) only 
enhances the fatal attraction of the adulterous affair, at the same time allowing 
the reader to indulge in this attraction without penalty. What is so profoundly 
disturbing and depressing about Madame Bovary is that it takes even this last 
refuge away from us—it depicts adultery in all its misery, as a false escape, an 
inherent moment of the dull and grey bourgeois universe. This is why Madame 
Bovary had to be brought to trial: it deprives the bourgeois individual of the last 
hope that an escape from the constraints of meaningless everyday life is possible. 
A passionate extramarital liaison not only poses no threat to conjugal love; rather, 
it functions as a kind of inherent transgression which provides the direct 
fantasmatic support to the conjugal link, and thus participates in what it purports 
to subvert. It is this very belief that, outside the constraints of marriage, in the 
adulterous transgression, we can really obtain “that,” full satisfaction, which is 
questioned by the hysterical attitude: hysteria involves the apprehension that the 
“real thing” behind the mask of the social etiquette is itself void, a mere 
mirage.68  
For Berlioz, writing under the shadow of Bovary, the cuckold myth, the fashionable covering 
that gives a kind of substance to the haunted, absent-centered married subject, has been 
revealed to be as insubstantial as the emperor’s new clothes. The transgressive element which 
is already caught by the ideological image of marriage—a transgression whose revolutionary 
force is, in brute reality, a phantom—can no longer be presented as an external limit which 
guarantees the consistency of marriage, and without it, Béatrice and Bénédict no longer 
experience the same overwhelming compulsion to capitulate to normative pressures: their 
increased symbolic violence is pushing at a door already slightly ajar. It may be Berlioz’s 
engagement with contemporary literature that enabled him to refashion Shakespeare’s play, or 
it may just be his radically different historic subjectivity that was the proximate cause of the 
                                                                                                                                                            
read about its scandalous aftershocks in the papers. And the influence may have been mutual: it is 
possible to suppose that part of the characterization of Frédéric’s first sight of Mme Arnoux, and 
his suicidal episode, in Bovary’s Sentimental Education might have been suggested by the 
extremely well-known story of the beginnings of Berlioz’s infatuation with Smithson. The 
following might easily have come from Berlioz’s program note to Symphonie fantastique: “She 
looked exactly like the women in romantic novels. He wouldn’t have wanted to add to or take 
away one single detail of her; the universe had suddenly become more spacious and She was the 
glittering focus of it all. So, lulled by the motion of the carriage and gazing up at the clouds with 
half-closed eyes, he surrendered to his dreams of never-ending bliss” (Gustave Flaubert, A 
Sentimental Education: The Story of a Young Man, trans. Douglas Parmée, Oxford World’s 
Classics  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 11.). I am grateful to Julian Rushton for 
suggesting this link to me. 
68 Slavoj Žižek, ed. Lacan: The Silent Partners (London and New York: Verso, 2006), 260. 
change. But either way, the fantasy at the heart of marriage is subjected by Berlioz to even 
more relentless scrutiny, I suggest, than it is by Shakespeare. I shall argue this more fully in 
Part II, but already in the libretto I think that Berlioz’s intentions emerge very clearly. In 
another of his interpolations of ideas that he did not find in Shakespeare, the friar announces, 
at Héro and Claudio’s wedding, that he has been asked to prepare a second marriage contract. 
Léonato asks who it is that feels the pull of the fantasy of marriage (“Qui se sentirait ici la 
fantaisie de se marier?”, NBE 3, 270, my italics). Is this another joke? Looking at the 
psychology of the music of Héro and Béatrice will provide an answer. 
The eradication of the external location of pain (adultery) means that any pain which is felt in 
love and marriage must inhere within the conception of marriage itself. There are two 
possible psychological responses to this reconfiguration, represented by Héro and Béatrice 
respectively: the masochist and the hysteric. In their most immediate meanings, these are 
Lacan’s clinical terms for what might naturally be conceived as “conventional” and 
“unconventional” responses to cultural pressures, terms which might more obviously seem to 
fit with the those two characters: but the effects of these psychological configurations on an 
understanding of the general effects of ideology are much more interesting than that. 
In the last section I emphasized the role of power in shaping the decisions and character of 
individuals, and as a final preparation for examining Berlioz’s characterizations of Héro and 
Béatrice the relation between the psyche and the power of ideological injunctions needs one 
more refinement. Judith Butler argues that we should think of this ideological power not only 
as a dominating external force that we internalize, in the Foucauldian sense, but rather as 
something on which “one’s very formation as a subject […] is in some sense dependent.”69 
That is, she suggests that this power is what constructs us as human subjects in the first place. 
Her reasoning is partly psychological: she observes that children first form “passionate 
attachments” to their same-sex parents, but that since same-sex love is officially prohibited by 
the symbolic order of our culture, that primordial attachment is suppressed. This primordial 
repression, or “foreclosure,” as Butler calls it, is then worked into the very fabric of our 
psyche, at the crucial level of gender, the level at which most people most basically 
understand themselves and other people. We repress that same-sex attachment, and assume a 
gendering that is based on its opposite—heterosexuality. The repression of this first 
“passionate attachment” means that gender is “a kind of melancholy, […] a mourning for 
unlived possibilities.”70  
Lacan’s term for these “passionate attachments” is the fundamental fantasy, and as Žižek 
points out in a very extended critique of Butler, Lacan’s conception avoids the logical error 
that both Butler and her starting point, Freud, fall into.71 In short, the logical problem is that 
Butler’s theory attempts to account for the traumatic first experience of difference—i.e., the 
recognition that there are others as well as me—from a starting point which already 
presupposes a world split into two different genders: the human subject who forms a 
“passionate attachment” to the same-sex parent has already, logically, determined that gender 
identifications exist. What Lacan insists is that the split which constitutes the psyche is not a 
split between an identifiable male and female, Self and Other, but actually a split within the 
                                                      
69 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1997), 2. 
70 ibid., 132 and 139. There are inevitable echoes here of Lukács’s “transcendental homelessness,” a 
kind of nostalgia for utopia (see György Lukács, The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-
Philosophical Essay on the Forms of Great Epic Literature, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin 
Press, 1971).). 
71 See Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (reprint, London 
and New York: Verso, 2008), 291–373. 
subject itself. To put it simply, humans are social beings, and depend on others for 
psychological comfort and security. This need for others locates a part of the subject in the 
Other, specifically in the objet a, the fantasy object that draws the split subject ineluctably 
both to “little others” (people, money, pints of beer…) and to the big Other, the symbolic 
order itself, in a perpetually unrealizable circuit of desire. Sexual identity does not precede 
this traumatic realization of difference, but proceeds from it, as a universal coping strategy. 
Sexual difference is not the opposition allocating to each of the two sexes its 
positive identity defined in opposition to the other sex (so that woman is what 
man is not, and vice versa), but a common loss on account of which woman is 
never fully a woman and man is never fully a man—“masculine” and “feminine” 
positions are merely two modes of coping with this inherent obstacle/loss.72  
Žižek’s argument neatly avoids another problem with Butler’s view, namely the implication 
that, since what makes us uncertain in our gender is that we have all repressed a forbidden 
same-sex “passionate attachment,” then if we were all gay we should all be more or less as 
happy as Larry. The existence of a single non-euphoric gay person would have the effect of 
calling her theory into question. From Žižek’s Lacanian perspective, however, the split is 
fundamental to all, and not dependent on sexuality: on the contrary, the split is constitutive of 
sexuality. Neither of the two basic biological sexes, and no sexuality, have any positive 
contents; all identifications depend on a fantasy relationship to the objet a which means that 
subjectivity is, in formal Hegelian terms, “abstract negativity.” But there is good news: “the 
need of ‘passionate attachment’ to provide for a minimum of being,” i.e., the barest 
psychological support for coping with life, beyond which there is only despair, “implies that 
the subject qua ‘abstract negativity’ […] is already there.”73 The subject is there in the form 
of the gap which, alone, “is” the subject. 
With that understanding in place it is simple to explain the meaning of “masochist” and 
“hysteric” in the Lacanian sense that will now underpin the music analysis of Part II. The 
masochist’s acceptance of the fundamental fantasy leads it to radically reformulate the 
Cartesian cogito, erg sum in terms which put the pain of the gap in subjectivity to the service 
of pleasure: “Look, I suffer, therefore I am, I exist, I participate in the positive order of 
being.”74 Existence itself, with the support of some kind of reliable and “whole” personal 
identity, depends therefore on a relatively straightforward act of “masochistic deception.” 
Žižek imagines 
the citizen of a country in which one’s head is cut off if one says publicly that 
the king is stupid; if this subject dreams that his head is to be cut off, this dream 
has nothing whatsoever to do with any kind of death wish, etc., it simply means 
that the subject thinks his king is stupid—that is, the predicament of suffering 
masks the pleasure of attacking the dignity of the king.75  
Similarly, in a society in which it is unacceptable symbolic violence to suggest that marriage 
                                                      
72 ibid., 324. 
73 ibid., 348. 
74 ibid., 337. 
75 ibid., 338. He observes further that “Such a strategy of deception, however, in which a scene of 
pain and suffering is put in the service of the pleasure of deceiving the superego, can function only 
on the basis of a more fundamental ‘sadomasochistic’ stance in which the subject engages in 
fantasizing about being exposed to passive painful experiences and is thus ready to accept, outside 
any deceptive strategy, pain itself as the source of libidinal satisfaction” (ibid.). 
is a false image of happiness, which leads to certain pain (the Beatrice and Benedick view), a 
subject who makes a great show of the “suffering of love,” as Héro does in her duet with 
Ursule, No. 8, is likewise performing a masquerade in the service of pleasure, criticizing 
painful reality without superego censorship—in other words, succumbing to the fundamental 
fantasy. Play-acting suffering masks the pleasure of submitting to the ideological injunction 
to marry. In “hysteria,” by contrast, the subject does not rely on the fundamental fantasy’s 
provision of a minimal positive support for being but rather, by disavowing all “passionate 
attachments,” refuses to accept that there is more to the subject than the uncertainty of the gap 
at its core. Accepting no identity that culture provides, no gendering such as that fixed by the 
symbols of marital conjunction, no self-objectification or essentialism of any kind, the 
“hysteric” allows the subject to emerge as “itself,” the void on the basis of which anything is 
possible. The Two of which Badiou speaks is a coming together of two such hysterics, a Two 
which does not allow its love to be defined by the world, being formed around such flexibly 
but violently codified identities such as “husband” and “wife,” but rather uses its love to 
reveal the truth of a new world. “What kind of truth?” Badiou asks. “What is the world like 
when it is experienced, developed, and lived from the point of view of difference and not 
identity?”76 The ways in which Béatrice establishes her subjectivity at a remove from the 
society represented in Berlioz’s opera, inviting Bénédict to join her there, and how that 
enables Berlioz, through a radical revision of Shakespeare, to offer possible answers to these 
questions, will be the topic of the final section. But before that, the masochistic deceptions of 
Héro should be examined in detail. 
Part II: The music of Béatrice et Bénédict 
The ideological and psychological structure of Berlioz’s musical language 
The locus of systemic violence in music from the eighteenth century to the present is the 
system of tonality. By this, I mean simply that tonality is, so to speak, the dominant ideology 
of music in the period from Bach to Schoenberg. Tonality regulates the age-old binary of 
consonance and dissonance in music, current since at least Pythagoras, in historically 
distinctive terms; and since such binary oppositions of “inside” and “outside,” “normal” and 
“deviant,” are the lifeblood of ideological configurations, the regulation of consonance and 
dissonance ought to be the principal focus of ideological analysis.77 Schenkerian analysis, 
which explains how even the remotest keys in a piece are ultimately regulated by their 
relationship to the composing-out of the tonic triad, is the most sophisticated means we have 
of understanding how the violence of the system operates. This is the case irrespective of 
whether one believes that tonality is an essentially patriarchal system whose systemic 
violence is a reflection and support of real-world patriarchal ideology, or, by contrast, that it 
is an autonomous and highly structured aesthetic space whose direct connection to human 
politics and society is an error (or any stance in between or outside these extremes).78  
                                                      
76 Alain Badiou, In Praise of Love, trans. Peter Bush (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2012), 22. 
77 Other elements of music are either controlled by tonality (melody, harmony) or simply do not exert 
anything like a regulatory force. Timbre, for instance, is a vital element of music, but no symphony 
was brought to a conclusion simply by force of the injunction “we must have strings now.” Even 
serialism can succumb to the tonal pull under the influence of a kind of residual tonality in handed-
down forms: for instance, Webern insisted, for his own symphony, that “the original form and 
pitch of the row occupy a position akin to that of the ‘main key’ in earlier music; the recapitulation 
will naturally return to it. We end ‘in the same key!’” (Anton Webern, The Path to the New Music, 
trans. Leo Black (Bryn Mawr, PA: T. Presser, 1963), 54.). 
78 These positions are most potently argued in the extensive debate between Susan McClary, Ruth A. 
Solie, and Pieter van den Toorn: see Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and 
Sexuality (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1991)., Ruth A. Solie, “What 
A large part of the objection to Schenkerian modes of analysis since the 1980s has come from 
scholars who view its tendency to encourage dismissal of what it brands the nonmusical or 
(only slightly better) extramusical contexts of music as politically offensive: where, they ask, 
are the musical actors, the real people who make, perform, and are, in part, culturally 
constructed by this music? But it seems to me that such objections simply hand the tools of 
Schenkerian analysis over to people who do not want to use them for much beyond note-
spotting, when there is potential for so much more. Sometimes, as with Schenker, extensive 
study of a phenomenon is undertaken because of a strong personal conviction that the subject 
of study is a good thing: in Schenker’s case, famously, because it demonstrates the superiority 
of German Geist over both foreign imitations and the disruptions of twentieth-century 
modernity. But at other times, as with one of the most extensive studies of capitalism, which 
was the life work of Karl Marx, the study is undertaken in order to understand exactly how a 
detested system works, and how potential fissures in its operation can be seen to open up. The 
motivations of the author are less important here than opponents of Schenker often seem to 
imagine, and I suggest that, despite the intellectual and political commitments of its inventor, 
Schenkerian analysis can be turned to ideological critique of tonality’s symbolic, its violently 
upheld order. If one wishes to understand just how it is that this passage of music has the 
effect of bringing that one to heel in such a way that its force evaporates, it may be that 
Schenkerian analysis is an effective means of proceeding.79  
One of the difficulties an analyst encounters when trying to understand Berlioz’s navigation 
of the symbolic of tonality is that he tends to minimize the sense of tonality’s violence, by the 
simple expedient of avoiding dissonance.80 Overwhelmingly he favors triadic configurations 
and major keys. Motion across tonal space is, as common in his period, frequently third-
related (although, unlike Schubert, who emphasized the hexatonically related ♭VI, Berlioz 
had a special predilection for ♭III). One of the means by which he effects hexatonic 
transformations, which is to “pun” on a note (say, a D♯ held in common between juxtaposed 
chords of B major and D♯ major, a T2 shift), can just as easily enable a shift of a semitone 
(say, from C major to C♯ minor by punning on the E). A pun is not merely a pivot: a pivot is 
located between two positions and eases the motion between them; a pun holds two 
possibilities together which are normally kept separate because they are considered distinct. A 
musical pivot—IV/C suddenly acting as V/B♭, for instance—may effect a swift motion to a 
new key, but a musical pun like these Berliozian examples holds the two keys together as a 
dialectical unity, making each the constitutive negation of the other. Puns reveal the endless 
deferment of the signifying chain, the motion of floating signifiers that are only momentarily 
quilted into position. These motions and others like them, such as his fondness for strings of 
diminished sevenths, therefore have the effect of achieving “the obliteration of the tonic; the 
new key is established by right of possession, not organically, and can sound remote even if it 
                                                                                                                                                            
do feminists want? A reply to Pieter van den Toorn,” The Journal of Musicology 9, no. 4 (1991), 
and Pieter C. van den Toorn, “Politics, feminism, and contemporary music theory,” ibid., no. 3  for 
the essential outlines. 
79 I argue this case for Schenker’s role in ideology critique much more extensively in J. P. E. Harper-
Scott, The Quilting Points of Musical Modernism: Revolution, Reaction, and William Walton 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
80 For an analysis of Berlioz’s treatment of tonality, see Julian Rushton, The Musical Language of 
Berlioz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)., particularly chapters 3 and 4. Rushton’s 
analysis throws up time and again compositional habits which, in a later theoretical context than 
that of 1983, would come under the orbit of neo-Riemannian theory. This is just one sense in 
which the book is ahead of its time, its insights by no means properly digested by the broader 
theoretical community. It still needs to be said that if some of the current analytical attention being 
paid to Schubert were directed towards Berlioz, there would be a useful injection of new blood into 
music theory. 
is not new at all.”81 By limiting his use of strongly directional, functional dissonances, Berlioz 
deliberately obscures the functioning of the tonal ideology. But that is not at all to say that he 
resists it. Indeed by concealing its operation, and so making the ideology transparent, he 
could be said to be denying the possibility of encountering that control as problematic. At this 
point one of the most frequently encountered truisms about Schubert should be turned on its 
head: rather than weakening the grip of the diatonic compulsion of V to resolve to I and so 
strengthen the urge of the tonic to gain (patriarchal) mastery over the tonal space, his 
technique of emphasizing third relations and establishing polarities which skirt around the 
tonic should be seen as part of a desire to provide false reassurance—“It’s OK, tonality is 
actually a perfectly liberating space to move around in: we might pay lip-service to a tonic 
resolution by the end, but we do so only on our own terms, as a result of a free choice.” The 
basic assumption about Schubert should therefore be that he makes the same claim as 
Beatrice and Benedick: “we have entered into conventional marriage, true, but there is at least 
a minimum degree of resistance built in, before the event, which purges it of ideological 
force” (i.e., the view I attributed to Claire McEachern above). On this understanding, the 
violent resolutions of Beethoven, which leave no doubt where dissonance is tending or when 
it has been resolved, are, in their frankness, a thematization of the violence of tonality, 
serving—for those minded to perform an ideology critique of tonal music—approximately the 
same function as Marx’s close attention to Capital. The violence that Beethoven does to us is 
not something he adds to tonality but something he reveals in it, so that we can gauge its 
strength and the effect that it has on us. 
**** Insert “ex1.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 1: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, 
middleground sketch of the entire structure.” **** 
  
Example 1 is a Schenkerian middleground analysis of the entire opera.82 It summarizes a 
structure that is, at best, only partly heard. There is spoken dialog—sometimes quite a lot of 
it—after almost every number in the opera, which will ensure that many listeners may lose 
the sense of key (the exceptions are 2b, 8, and 9; No. 14 is followed by only a single line, 
                                                      
81 ibid., 39. Again, this suggests a Schubertian procedure of decentering: see Nicholas Marston, 
“Schubert's homecoming,” Journal of the Royal Musical Association 125, no. 2 (2000). 
82 The unorthodox decision to present a single graph for an entire opéra comique rather than a series 
of graphs for its individual numbers is not taken lightly; it has a strong theoretical justification. In 
orthodox Schenkerian analysis, the final important perfect authentic cadence (henceforth “PAC,” a 
cadence in which the tonic chord is reached with the melody coming to rest on ^1) achieves the 
closure of the Ursatz. I find that students studying Schenker often wonder what is so special about 
this cadence that it can achieve what no other PAC in the piece can do, and my answer is always 
that, unlike the others, this one is the last: once we know the piece has ended, we retrospectively 
mark this PAC as the closure of the Ursatz (and if we have a sense of how music like this tends to 
go, we will already have considered it as a potential closure of the Urstaz, to be confirmed shortly). 
This idea can be taken a stage further. It is evident that composers choose the keys of separate 
movements in a work with an eye to their suitability to the general tonal context of the work. In a 
B♭ Viennese string quartet it would be quite normal to have the slow movement in E♭, highly 
surprising to have it in B minor. Just as a listener regards a mid-movement PAC as a putative but 
not actual closure, its status confirmed by the simple fact that it is followed by more music, so the 
PAC which ends the first movement retrospectively gains a sense of provisionality when the 
second movement begins and it becomes clear that there is more music to come within the tonal 
space of this work. Since it is no offense to the essential logic of Schenkerian conceptions of tonal 
space, and it makes better sense of the way that a sequence of movements continues to explore a 
process of discourse begun at the start of the piece, it seems fair to consider that, until a work is 
finished, in a very real sense the tonal parameters established at its beginning continue to 
contribute to the exposition of the music, and consequently that any analysis of that unfolding 
which seeks to examine its controlling effect as symbolic order should read the whole as a unity. 
which might not be long enough to eradicate the sense of key for many listeners). There is 
also an interval between the acts. So the prolongation of this tonal structure across the opera 
is not one that any listener could plausibly be expected to hear.83 But the same is true for the 
tonal structure of, say, Das Rheingold or Elektra, even though they lack either intervals or 
dialog to break up the tonal architecture. Schenker himself believed that his Ursatz could be 
heard, but I think he was probably deluding himself, except in very short pieces. Yet none of 
this invalidates the Schenkerian approach to examining tonal structure for the very important 
reason that while the actual sounds of music are addressed to the conscious mind, these 
deeper structures work on the subconscious level. And like any other work of art, or any 
discursive formation whatever, the relation of the ostensible communication and the partly or 
wholly concealed structure of the statement can be subjected to analysis, to enable something 
like the reading that Shaw proposes of Shakespeare’s “word music”: with Schenkerian 
analysis, once again, “the ‘secret’ to be unveiled through analysis is not the content hidden by 
the form,” e.g., the mere existence of the Ursatz (as if discovering that it is a ^5-line is a 
valuable exercise in itself), “but, on the contrary, the ‘secret’ of this form itself,” i.e., the 
secret that tonality, the opera’s musical big Other, is establishing an ideological framework 
within which the music of the opera moves at the conscious level.84  
The middleground graph shows a strongly composed-out G major spanning the two acts, with 
two important subsidiary focuses on chords VI and ♭VI. The overture and numbers 1–8 
unfold a strong I–II–V–(VI)–I progression in G, which is further prolonged by a lower 
neighbor F in No. 6. Up till No. 6, Berlioz’s opera has not ventured further than 
Shakespeare’s Act 1 scene 1: consequently this first unfolding of G major underpins an 
introduction of the main characters and Héro’s aria of expectation (“Je vais le voir”; “I am 
going to see him [Claudio]”). The spoken dialog after No. 6 leaps suddenly to Act 2 scene 3, 
for the tricking of Bénédict. After exclaiming that “the world must be peopled” (“il faut que 
le monde soit peuplé”), Bénédict sings his excited rondo, No. 7, in the opera’s tonic. 
Everything seems to be going according to plan. But then in the last number of Act 1, No. 8, 
which is the opera’s most beautiful number, Héro and Ursule sing their Duo–Nocturne on the 
“tenderness and pain of true love,”85 picking up ultimately on the key of No. 4, E major (it is 
the pain we hear first: E major is prefaced by its relative, C♯ minor; and pain returns in the 
form of G♯ minor for the second duet section, before we are returned to the sweetness of E 
major at the end). The note E, which had merely provided an upper neighbor to the dominant 
in the first unfolding, is now treated to extensive prolongation, reaching till the end of No. 12 
in Act 2. The “entr’acte” decorates it with an upper neighbor that falls, at the beginning of No. 
9, the drinking chorus of the musicians and servants who are preparing for the wedding of 
Héro and Claudio. The melodic line rises across Nos. 8 and 9 as a third-progression, G♯–A–B, 
and the whole span composes-out a modal mixture, moving from VI (E major) in No. 8 to vi 
(E minor) in No. 9. Nos. 10 and 11, Béatrice’s aria (her rough equivalent to Bénédict’s No. 7) 
                                                      
83 It is possible to imagine an exceptional case in which the opera is heard in a recording that lacks 
the spoken dialog, in a single sitting, in which an extraordinarily attentive structural listener might 
hear this structure—but that seems such a fantastically remote contingency that it is just as well to 
discount it. 
84 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 3. The following analysis of the ideological structures of 
the opera is, additionally, no different from a historical, sociological, ethnographic, or critical study 
of any music’s composition, performance, or reception: analysis is one of the non-temporal ways 
of responding to music outside of the moment of performance, not categorically different from 
what more or less everybody does when they talk about why a song means something to them, or 
why they think a particular new album is rubbish. The only difference is that, sometimes, scholars 
like to pretend that it is more problematic, simply because they do not like to do it themselves. It is 
odd that this objection has ever been given any credence. 
85 Rushton, “Berlioz’s swan-song,” 110. 
and the women’s trio, decorate this ^6 with a strongly projected E♭ (No. 10) that acts as a 
dominant to the A♭ of No. 11. As the chorus call on “Hymen’s fortunate victim” (“l’hyménée 
victime fortunée”) to come to the wedding in No. 12, we return to E major and the entire 
parenthetical prolongation of ^6 is rounded off (its parenthetical function is marked by 
brackets in Example 1). The wedding march, No. 13, returns us to the tonic G major; 
Bénédict “the married man” gets his sign in No. 14, which comically moves from G minor to 
major; and the work achieves a triumphant close in G major in the finale, No. 15, but with the 
promise that this “truce” will be ended “tomorrow.” 
The opera therefore navigates its tonal space in three broad movements: outer sections in G 
major, and a central section in two third-related keys, VI and ♭VI. There is a striking 
association between the chosen keys and the main subject of each of the musical sections; 
although Wagner’s “associative tonality,” like his use of leitmotif, is richer and more complex 
than anything encountered in Béatrice et Bénédict, the relative simplicity of Berlioz’s design, 
if anything, makes his presentation of the ideological message clearer. I shall give the grounds 
for deciding on these associations throughout the coming analysis, but it is useful to list them 
first, without support. G major is consistently associated with the idea of marriage, and all the 
political and economic burden that carries, along with its insistence that human beings settle 
on a fixed “identity.”86 This is, as Part I of this essay demonstrated, the chief ideological 
playground for both Shakespeare and Berlioz, but Berlioz’s treatment of it is different. As the 
master signifier by which, in the context of this story, the big Other quilts reality, it is entirely 
appropriate that G major should be so stably associated with marriage, and should govern the 
opera as “tonic,” the musical marker, from the eighteenth century onwards, of “normality.” G 
minor, when it appears, is associated with negative attitudes towards marriage. E (major or 
minor) has an association with what I call the “masochistic” attitude towards marriage. This 
can otherwise be articulated as the response to the superego’s basic injunction, “Enjoy!”—the 
call to obey the law in pursuit of an impossible jouissance, the pursuit of which will lead to 
the surplus-jouissance that comes from turning pain to pleasure.87 E♭ and its subdominant, A♭, 
are associated with the “hysterical” attitude which refuses to credit the claims of the big Other, 
and so refuses to “Enjoy!”. Attention to diatonic and hexatonic relations here deepens 
awareness of the balance within the systemic violence of the G-major tonic. E, the 
“masochistic” response which serves to turn the suffering caused by that violence to 
enjoyment, is, in the minor mode, diatonically related to G. As a tonicization of ^6, the use of 
E major in Nos. 8 and 12 simply enhances the sense that this masochism is pleasurable (as, in 
a differently intoxicated way, does the E minor of the drinking song, No. 9, its minor mode by 
no means sad or regretful). Chord VI is, then, a faithful support of the tonic. But the relation 
between E♭ and G is hexatonic, and at both structural and surface levels the motion between 
those chords operates according to the long-appreciated Berliozian logic of “the obliteration 
of the tonic.”88 Tonally, then, the projection very neatly articulates the chief ideological 
conflicts between the conventional view of love, which reaches fulfillment in marriage, and 
the revolutionary view of Béatrice and Bénédict (though, as will be shown, Béatrice is its 
                                                      
86 As same-sex marriage moves homosexual forms of union into the center ground of cultural 
normativity, it too insists on the establishment of identity—as a gay man or woman—as an 
essential, unshifting component. 
87 Developing for the first time his connection between psychoanalysis and ideology critique, Žižek 
observes that without the Law, the imposition of rules, contrary to expectations there is a universal 
Prohibition: “enjoyment itself, which we experience as ‘transgression,’ is in its innermost status 
something imposed, ordered—when we enjoy, we never do it ‘spontaneuously,’ we always follow 
a certain injunction. The psychoanalytic name for this obscene injunction, for this obscene call, 
‘Enjoy!’, is superego” (Slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political 
Factor (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 9–10.). 
88 Rushton, The Musical Language of Berlioz, 39. 
chief architect and greatest visionary). 
The principal exception to the outline I have just given appears to be No. 4, the Béatrice and 
Bénédict duet in which both dispraise marriage and deny loving each other: although starting 
and ending in E major, it does not seem to have an obviously positive response to the 
superego’s “Enjoy!”. Yet that injunction does still frame their duet. Bénédict explains the 
“true happiness” (“vrai bonheur”) of his relationship with Béatrice by the fact that, although 
he is adored of all ladies, he is not loved by her (“Qu’adoré de de toutes les femmes, […] je 
ne sois point aimé de vous”). To be loved by a woman is, in heteronormative discourse, the 
necessary “completion” of the identity of a man, by means of fixing the relation of the subject 
to the (sexual) drive. Other women offer him that structure, but Béatrice offers to free him 
from it. It is Héro’s masochistic pleasure to accept that offer—the “normative” response—in 
No. 8. Indeed, the framing tonality of E major in the No. 4 duet points to the fact that Béatrice 
and Bénédict both stand at risk of being interpellated as subjects precisely in relation to that 
fantasy. The desire drawing the subject to that identification circulates around an objet a, and 
this is represented by the “curious pleasure” that each finds in baiting the other (“qual plaisir 
étrange trouvé-je à l’irriter!”). It is this powerful but indescribable quantum of desire that 
brings them together in their “merry war,” uniting them to such a degree that they sing the 
same lines in overlapping phrases (mm. 132ff.). In this duet they are therefore both “fools,” 
expressly enjoying the business of “snatching a little piece of jouissance away from the 
Master”: their relationship is framed by marriage, which acts as the external definition of their 
“merry war,” but which, as Nuttall shows, lays them entirely open to the easy slippage from 
this surplus-enjoyment to the non-sequent conclusion that it would be perfected—and their 
identities fixed—in marriage. Yet elements of their eventual resistance to this fantasy 
projection are present in nuce in the way that the two characters are differentiated. The duet 
opens in E major but within five measures Béatrice has moved it onto the dominant, where it 
remains until Bénédict’s entrance at m. 29. He picks that chord up and resolves it back in E 
major at m. 36, holding it there until Béatrice enters again at m. 58, where she proposes an A 
major that he accepts (“vous avez raison,” m. 66) as a means of returning to E at m. 84. Till 
this point, Béatrice has tended away from E major, Bénédict towards it; but as he reflects on 
his potential interpellation by the other women who love him, he wanders off-tonic to tonicize 
B minor (m. 123). Bénédict seems more obviously open to the possibility of marriage than 
Béatrice, or at least one based on the “foolish” idea that as long as there was some initial 
resistance they can construct a marriage that fits them rather than fitting themselves to a 
cultural requirement. Rushton gives a sound explanation for this difference in temperament 
between the two: “in the social milieu of this drama the woman is normally the subordinate 
partner in marriage. [… T]o a woman of Beatrice’s temper, resistant to assumptions of male 
superiority, marriage represents a greater sacrifice than it does for a man.”89 As the opera 
continues, Béatrice will move increasingly far from the momentary accommodation with 
masochism that she reaches here. 
**** Insert “ex2.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 2: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, No. 5, 
G-minor moment.” ****  
Most elementally, the way that the fantasy of marriage folds potential challenges (desertion, 
unfaithfulness) into its own positive content (the cultural insistence that marriage is strong 
and will endure these challenges) is represented musically by the opposition of G major and 
minor. The high-jinks of the overture can brook only two measures of G minor, curtly 
brushed aside (mm. 202–3), and we do not hear a tonicization of the chord again until 
Bénédict tells Claudio and Don Pedro, in the trio, No. 5, that he would rather rot in a cloister 
than marry (“plutôt moisir dans un convent!”: see Example 2). But the tonicization, while it is 
obviously expressing a pointedly negative attitude towards marriage, lasts barely more than 
                                                      
89 Rushton, “Berlioz’s swan-song,” 113. 
four measures (from m. 77 to the downbeat of m. 82), and can generate no new material to 
ground the key (the orchestra simply repeats Bénédict’s cadential figure, twice). The music 
returns to G major for Bénédict’s misogynistic speech—tellingly, perhaps, since misogyny is, 
as Béatrice knows, the prop of conventional marriage as exogamous exchange. Both here and 
in the overture, and even more powerfully in the “Enseigne,” No. 14, which is a single 
progression from G minor to G major (to the words “here you may see Benedick, the married 
man”; “ici l’on voit Bénédict l’homme marié”), the minor-mode opposition is given a 
ridiculous presentation, with marriage the only “realistic” possibility: articulating a strong G 
minor requires a feat of symbolic violence far in excess of anything Bénédict can achieve. 
Already by No. 7 he has decided that “the world must be peopled” (“il faut que le monde soit 
peuplé”) and blazes out an unproblematic G major in full support of the script he discounted 
as his own so bootlessly in the trio. After the G-major wedding march for Héro and Claudio 
(No. 13) and the “Enseigne,” the opera is set for an ostensibly comfortable resolution into the 
tonic in Béatrice’s and Bénédict’s final declarations of love. But I shall argue that, not only 
because of that final “joke” about the “truce,” but also because of the way that Béatrice’s 
music articulates an excessive truth that opens up a new world, that final G major is by no 
means the solid ideological fantasy of marriage that it appears: Béatrice has by this point re-
quilted its meaning.90 Since Béatrice’s awareness of the pain that the systemic pressure to 
marry causes is enhanced by the masochistic example of Héro, it is to this music that I now 
turn. 
Héro, masochist 
Béatrice et Bénédict deviates from Much Ado in being clear that Héro loves Claudio before 
the action begins. In the spoken text of scene 2, during a conversation about the men’s return 
from war, Héro says “and … Claudio will be accompanying him [Don Pedro], no doubt?” 
(“Et … Claudio le suit, sans doute?”), and after scene 3, still spoken, establishes the “war of 
epigrams” between Béatrice and Bénédict, we get confirmation of the depth—and the 
psychology—of Héro’s love in her aria “Je vais le voir,” No. 3. The psychology is not a 
happy one, but Berlioz had a history of interest in psychological illness. It was evident as 
early as the Symphonie fantastique, which Francesca Brittan shows to have been influenced 
by a rich array of voguish, ethically stigmatized pathologies in literary and medical writings 
of its time, a context of which his audience could have been expected to be at least generally 
aware.91 Berlioz was, as Brittan reminds us, the son of a doctor and himself a quondam 
medical student who, at least in this early period of his maturity, might have been 
“constructing his own erotic disorder and that of his ‘fantastic’ protagonist according to the 
detailed descriptions of manic fixation saturating scientific and journalistic writing of the 
period.”92 The specific diagnosis that Brittan prefers from the available options—for both 
Berlioz and his figure of the artist—is that of the “erotomaniac,” not only fixated on a 
                                                      
90 James Haar avers that “The work is formally symmetrical […]. Beatrice and Benedick each have a 
single aria; there is a duet for the two in each act; a male trio in Act I is balanced by a female trio 
in Act II; the quicksilver opening of the overture uses the beginning of the duo that closes the 
work” (James Haar, “The operas and the dramatic legend,” ed. Peter Bloom (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 95.). This is true as a general observation, but there is no 
“balance” here in the sense that these items can be considered emotionally, musically, or above all 
ideologically, equivalent. What may seem on a cursory examination to be elements that harmonize 
or stabilize the whole turn out, on closer inspection, to create ruptures within it. 
91 “When, in 1830, Berlioz assigned his symphonic hero the symptoms of monomania—a 
melancholic-frenetic delirium characterized by an idée fixe—he was not describing a vague or 
imaginary nervous disorder, but a maladie morale that would have been easily identified by many 
of those in the concertgoing public” (Francesca Brittan, “Berlioz and the pathological fantastic: 
melancholy, monomania, and romantic autobiography,” 19th-Century Music 29, no. 3 (2006): 222). 
92 ibid., 222–3. 
beloved but also subject to excesses of passion, of loquacity, delirium, and suicidal 
depression—all of which are strikingly present in the Symphonie fantastique. And obvious 
evidence of a continuing fascination with pathology is in plain view in Béatrice et Bénédict, 
where in the trio, No. 5, Bénédict upbraids Claudio and Don Pedro for their matrimoniomania 
(“matrimoniomanie”), and they him for his matrimoniophobia (“matrimoniophobie”): both do 
not just oppose but actually psychoanalyze the opposite position. I suggest that Berlioz’s 
musical imagining of Héro shows clear signs of a psychoanalytic presentation of a type which 
bears some relation to the erotomaniac of Brittan’s study. But in the frame of Lacan’s theory, 
which highlights, as early nineteenth-century psychiatry did not (could not, before Freud and 
Marx), the problematics of the subconscious and the inconsistency of the human subject and 
the social order of which it is part, she is not an erotomaniac but a masochist.  
To more fully understand the concept of the masochist, which I have already partly 
introduced, it is useful to return to the Foucauldian conception of the internalization of 
ideology. As Žižek remarks in the involved critique of Butler from which I have already 
quoted, “what this simplistic notion of ‘internalization’ misses is the reflexive turn by means 
of which, in the emergence of the subject, external power (the pressure it exerts on the subject) 
is not simply internalized but vanishes, is lost; and this loss is internalized in the guise of the 
‘voice of conscience,’ the internalization which gives birth to the internal space itself.”93 That 
“internal space” is the subject, which “is” nothing but a gap, a void, and which submits to the 
fundamental fantasy by forming “passionate attachments” to the Other, though the Other 
itself has no consistency (it is “lost”); the “voice of conscience” is the superego. The example 
of a parent’s injunction to a child draws out the distinction between an external, repressive 
law and the superego’s command to achieve surplus-jouissance, which superficially seems 
more liberal. 
The parental figure who is simply “repressive” in the mode of symbolic authority 
tells a child: “You must go to Grandma’s birthday party and behave nicely, even 
if you’re bored to death—I don’t care how you feel, just do it!” The superego 
figure, in contrast, tells the child: “Although you know how much Grandma 
would like to see you, you should visit her only if you really want to—if not, you 
should stay at home!” The superego trick lies in this false appearance of a free 
choice, which, as every child knows, is actually a forced choice that involves an 
even stronger order—not only “You must visit Grandma, however you feel!”, 
but “You must visit Grandma, and, furthermore, you must be glad to do it!”—the 
superego orders you to enjoy doing what you have to do.94  
In this scenario, the child does not want to visit Grandma; Grandma is boring, and visiting her 
would be painful. The masochistic child turns that pain to pleasure: he does not enjoy the 
boredom of the birthday party, but instead enjoys the thought that afterwards, his parents will 
feel guilty about having put him through this agony just to keep up appearances. This fantasy 
allows the child to experience the pain of his actual existence—the tedium of Grandma’s 
party—as surplus-jouissance. Héro, Béatrice, Ursule, Claudio, Bénédict, all the characters in 
the world of Béatrice et Bénédict, are given an ostensibly free choice to marry, a choice 
whose freedom inheres in the idea that they will only be expected to marry if they feel that it 
is the right thing for them. The tricks that are played on them simply reveal what they already 
“know” to be the case about their own desires.95 Héro must marry Claudio, and she must 
                                                      
93 Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, 335. 
94 ibid., 319–20. 
95 This is the cultural logic of today’s changes to marriage law throughout the West, where same-sex 
marriages are gradually being legalized. The apparent offer is: “look, you can even marry someone 
of your own sex, so you don’t need to force yourself into a sexuality that doesn’t suit,” but the real 
enjoy it, because not to enjoy it is to denigrate marriage (that being the sin of which Béatrice 
is guilty). She finds ways to do it. Béatrice, by contrast, resists. 
Héro is strikingly unhappy for someone who seems to be engaged to be married, particularly 
in her duet with Ursule, No. 8, throughout which she is in tears. What is the cause of this 
unhappiness? We cannot make the normal feminist answer that she is sad simply because she 
is about to enter into a social institution that profoundly limits the freedom of women; what 
that view fails to take into account is that even if that institution were reconfigured so that it 
better suited her personal needs, she would feel a redoubling of the force of the superego 
demand: resistance is, in this case, surrender. The only persuasive answer is that her sadness 
is a result of her decision to accept any ideological mandate at all, to cover the void in her 
own psyche: it is not the content of the identification that is causing her to be sad, but the 
commitment to identification tout court, the “secret” of the form of the identification. If, then, 
we interpret her music’s mood as a masquerade of pain that is serving some specific purpose 
in relation to the superego injunction, her sadness becomes easier to parse. When she and 
Ursule are testing that Béatrice’s last resistance to marriage has broken down, in the trio No. 
11, they imagine a state of affairs in which the marriage between Héro and Claudio has turned, 
through habit, to boredom, disgust, regret, jealousy, coldness, and eventually adultery. This is 
precisely the progression from jig to measure and cinquepace that Beatrice warns Hero of in 
Much Ado, and here as there, Béatrice is horrified by the thought. But Héro laughs and says 
she was only joking: Claudio will remain faithful to her. Yet in her own aria, “Je vais le voir,” 
and in the “Duet–Nocturne” with Ursule, we had already witnessed her succumbing to 
something like the same concerns. The prospect of marrying Claudio, who has returned to her 
from war, delights her, seeming to chime with her essential desires, yet to submit to him in 
marriage means to lose a goodly portion of her present freedom, by accepting the fullness of 
her symbolic mandate as woman in a patriarchal society. This is not a prospect that she can 
enjoy, but by submitting to the superego’s command even though she knows that it is painful 
for her, she can extract pleasure from the thought that this pain does at least give her symbolic 
consistency: this pain can be borne because it is less terrifying than leaping into the existential 
abyss of accepting the inconsistency of subjectivity. Like the lover in a courtly love lyric, she 
can accept the pain because it comes from that which does her good (the Lady; marriage), and 
which fixes her in an identity for which society will honor her (a noble lover; a faithful wife). 
In other terms, this masochistic behavior is what Heidegger calls obtaining “tranquillity” by 
submitting to cultural convention, which he calls “the they”: “The supposition of the ‘they’ 
that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’, brings Dasein a tranquillity, for 
which everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open.”96  
**** Insert “ex3.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 3: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, “Je 
vais le voir,” middleground sketch.” ****  
The progress of the fantasy is already in train in No. 3, where Héro luxuriates in the painful 
pleasure of knowing that she is moving from jig to measure, choosing as a free woman to 
submit to the humiliation of taking the subordinate role in a patriarchal relationship for the 
sake of symbolic consistency. Her masochist pleasure in this moment of transition, in her firm 
step towards interpellation, is drawn out for as long as possible. The first half of the aria 
luxuriates in the sweet possibility that her conventional love affords. It opens tenderly with an 
                                                                                                                                                            
message is: “you now have even less of an excuse not to marry: you must still submit to this social 
norm, because we’ve bent over backwards to make it pleasant for you, and so you must enjoy it, or 
be horribly ungrateful to your society, which will repay you in appropriate fashion.” 
96 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1962), 222. The sense in which this “tranquillizing” submission is a means of 
medicating against pain resonates too with Marx’s potent and familiar image of the “opiate,” which 
can be extended here from religion to the totality of social commitments. 
A major theme on solo cello, Larghetto, which Héro repeats and develops, arpeggiating 
through C♯ minor (m. 25) to E (m. 29) before closing back into A (m. 44) for an equally 
tender recapitulation (see Example 3). The sedate pace of the composing-out of the tonic triad 
creates a contentedly serene air which the subdued orchestration—strings and woodwind, 
with clarinets and horns sparingly used—as well as the elegant, slow sarabande rhythm of the 
melody, and the unrushed and uncomplicated completion of the Ursatz enhance.97 But at m. 
75 a sudden change in tempo (Allegro con fuoco) and key (D major) generate a sense of 
rushing forwards, of realizing potential: the aria’s opening A major turns out retrospectively 
to have been a hugely prolonged dominant, a key that points not to its own serene present but 
to a more fervid future. (If this motion builds into a chain of fifths, the next step from D 
would be to G, the key of marriage—which eventually comes in No. 5, the men’s trio.)  
Her first words in this faster section appear to be a simple expression of confidence in 
Claudio’s fidelity: “He is returning faithfully to me” (“Il me revient fidèle”). But since she 
will articulate this idea in No. 11 as a joke, it is also clear that she is here repressing a fear 
that he might not be faithful—a fear that, naturally, brings her additional masochistic pleasure. 
It is the physical symbol of her subjection to symbolic order, however—“my hand will be the 
prize” (“ma main sera le prix”)—from which she wrings the greatest surplus-jouissance. She 
delivers the text of the aria’s second half, which culminates in this line, in twenty-one 
breathless measures, which move purposively to the new dominant, A major (m. 104); but on 
the next two iterations of the text she attempts to divert the course of events with brief 
cadential motions, two to B minor (mm. 128 and 174), one to C♯ minor. These prove in each 
case insufficient symbolic force to disrupt the course of events: the pull of the D major 
tonality, the preparation for marriage’s G major in the next number, is much too strong, and 
the first of these tonicizations is given no credence (one beat of rest is enough to rob it of its 
position, and the downbeat of m. 131 bluffly reasserts D major), the second is folded neatly 
into the dominant at m. 154, and the third returns, like an obedient chord VI should, to the 
dominant at m. 176.98 This ideology brooks no opposition, and Héro’s libidinal pleasure in her 
staged failure to resist is obvious: the thrill of the return of D major at m. 131 produces a 
wordless high trilling D which terminates in a convulsive little rush to F♯, and when her C♯-
minor cadence is pulled into the dominant, her excited tingle is moved into the first violins, 
which trill, now for six and a half measures, on an A. Things are moving on fast, but not so 
fast that Héro cannot check the progress of her interpellation in order to enjoy one last almost 
orgasmic access of perverse pleasure. At m. 206 she returns to the motives of the opening A-
major section, and spins them out into an absurdly distended cadenza which avoids a perfect 
cadence more than a dozen times, in the meantime doing little more than prolonging the 
dominant chord (see Example 4). The cadenza would sound less absurd if it were more 
thematic, more harmonically varied—if, that is, it had a purpose to exist beyond merely 
delaying the inevitable—but perverse pleasure is all that the superego allows. Surplus-
jouissance emerges from the very last syllable in which the coming events are kept firmly in 
the future, distinct from the current pleasure she is taking in their deferment—i.e., the last 
syllable of the word sera. She will submit to her forced choice: her hand will be the prize for 
his valor in war, and her prize for this submission is the joy of obeying the superego 
command itself. It is an aria that St. Augustine would have understood: “grant me chastity 
and continence, but not yet.” 
**** Insert “ex4.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 4: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, “Je 
vais le voir,” masochistic pleasure in the cadenza.” **** 
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the lovely Sicilienne before this aria begins, so it is a triply “comfortable” key. 
98 Rushton, too finds these tonicizations remarkable, though ultimately finds the aria expressive of 
“the utmost cheerfulness”: Rushton, “Berlioz’s swan-song,” 110. 
**** Insert “ex5.pdf” round here. Caption: “Example 5: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, “Duo–
Nocturne,” opening of duet.” ****  
Hugh Macdonald claims that the Duet–Nocturne, No. 8, is “scarcely functional to the action,” 
but although it can be seen as a return to the ambience of the first part of Héro’s aria, 
exploring new avenues of the same thought, it adds something more.99 Its music is even more 
beautiful, and the addition of Ursule adds greater encouragement, greater social pressure, for 
the spectator to rise to its gorgeous bait. In form, it falls into two parts, each beginning with a 
short C♯-minor dialog in which Ursule asks, first, why Héro is sighing, and second, why she 
is weeping. The answer in both cases is masochistic, deriving pleasure from suffering, 
humiliation, and submission to the identity of the fiancée (an identity she considers so 
essential that she calls it her “soul”): “Happiness oppresses my soul. I can’t think of it without 
trembling, despite myself” (“Le bonheur oppresse mon âme. Je ne puis y songer, sans 
trembler malgré moi”); “These tears relieve my soul. You’ll feel yours flow, too, when your 
own love is crowned” (“Ces larmes soulagent mon âme; Tu sentiras couler les tiennes à ton 
tour, Le jour où tu verras couronner ton amour!”). This stirs Ursule, and both women join in 
the masochistic deception, with a bewitching E-major melody which they sing largely in 
sonorous thirds to the accompaniment of zephyr-soft string arpeggios (starting at m. 13; see 
Example 5) which encourage an unforced motion to E major. After a perfect authentic 
cadence establishes a calm tonic closure at m. 56, and they have their brief exchange about 
weeping, a second duet melody is suspended by similar orchestral breezes in G♯ minor 
(starting m. 68), until the addition of a B♯ to the harmony (m. 86) enables a smooth transition 
back to the original duet melody, with its C♯-minor-to-E major motion. This is seductive 
music, as capable of concealing its ideological persuasion as the joy of Beatrice’s and 
Benedick’s wordplay is its own manipulative business in Much Ado, but Berlioz goes still 
further, providing two instrumental codas of exquisite beauty—the first a duet between violas 
and two flutes (from m. 134), the second an astonishing ppp susurration of eight-part divisi 
violins (echoes of Lohengrin) over a gently gurgling clarinet, thrumming cellos, and pizzicato 
violas and double basses, picking out ^1 and ^5 of the tonic chord (from m. 151). The cup of 
surplus-jouissance runneth over. As Rushton observes, “the Nocturne is a generalized 
expression of the tenderness and pain of true love”: this is our invitation, as attractive as 
Berlioz can make it, to accept the big Other’s offer of “tranquillity.”100  
Béatrice, hysteric 
It appears by the end of the opera that Béatrice and Bénédict have yielded to this ideological 
goad, and indeed—as the foregoing discussion of his rondo, No. 5, indicates—Bénédict has 
been on the verge for some time. But Béatrice, the most brilliant character in the opera, has 
her mind bent on a radical reconfiguring of the tonal space, and with it, of the opera’s final 
idea of a love that can create a new world. The existing world is, as Example 1 shows, 
governed by G major and the conventional social scripts for marriage. When the call comes 
for subjects to interpellate in that order, they either do so with unrestrained willingness, 
seemingly blind to any negative effects that may obtain (Bénédict in “Ah! je vais l’aimer,” No. 
7) or, while being aware of the negatives, nevertheless obtaining surplus-jouissance by means 
of masochistic deception (Héro in “Je vais le voir,” No. 3; Héro and Ursule in the Duet–
Nocturne, No. 8). Béatrice alone is different, and her aria “Dieu! Que viens-je d’entendre,” 
No. 10, manages to recognize marriage as fundamentally and irredeemably flawed (and so 
rejects masochistic surplus-jouissance) and also attests to the fact that though the symbolic 
order is strong, its strength is arbitrary and without a basis in “truth.” 
**** Insert “ex6.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 6: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, No. 4, 
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mm. 121–3.” ****  
The first task, the radical assertion of marriage as a flawed thing to be rejected, requires a 
decisive intervention in a tonal struggle that has been very uneven so far in the opera. Each 
time that the chord of G minor, the dark side to marriage’s eternally optimistic G major, has 
been presented so far, it has been rejected as an unrealistic, cynical intrusion. In the Overture, 
before textual indications have solidified the tonal associations of the tonic, a brief cadence in 
G minor (mm. 202–5) is abruptly pulled towards D major and thence G major. The chord is 
not heard again, except for brief passing motions in No. 1, until the Béatrice/Bénédict duo, 
No. 4, “Comment le dédain pourrait-il mourir?”—and even there it is not, strictly speaking, a 
G minor chord at all (see Example 6). Here, a chord of G–A♯–D, which contains the pitches 
of G minor but “is not” that chord, passes directly onto a G major chord that it is decorating 
as part of a ♯VI–V–i progression onto B minor (minor v in the context of the duet). It is worth 
drawing to attention here the way that normal tonal theory, or at least theory that is 
contrapuntal in inclination, normalizes such moments within the unfolding of tonal space 
without, perhaps, most listeners—or analysts—being fully aware of the ideological work that 
is being done. Although a jazz or guitar notation, for instance, might notate the first two beats 
of m. 122 as G minor followed by G major, since that notation would tell a performer to play 
those notes, a voice-leading analysis would make such a reading “nonsense”: the A♯ is 
simply a neighbor to the Bs immediately before (in the lower register) and after (in the same 
register), and part of a very slightly decorated v–i6–♮VI–V7–i motion. True enough. But it is 
nevertheless theoretically essential to be sensitive to the quilting effect that tonality has: the 
chord in question is genuinely, physically, the same as a G minor chord (at least on a piano; 
orchestral musicians and singers may tune the A♯ a little higher than a B♭ would be), but it 
must “properly” be understood, in accordance with the master signifier of tonality, as a 
decoration of G major and not a chord in its own right. It is “wrong” to name this chord G 
minor because that would be to assert a level of autonomy that it simply does not have within 
the hegemonic tonal order; but at the same time it is right to note that this need not be so, and 
that that concatenation of notes is only understood in this way because of the systemic 
violence of tonality, and its sure control of all its subservient elements. In essence, the 
progression from G minor (this time, literally G minor) to G major in the “Enseigne,” No. 14, 
is simply making explicit the systemic violence which ensures that this tiny, insignificant 
chord in m. 122 of No. 4 is brought into proper symbolic order. And it is only because 
Béatrice has acted so powerfully to countermand tonality’s imposition of symbolic order that 
the grandiloquent gestures of No. 14 are necessary at all: they are, comically of course, but 
also seriously, gestures which reveal a system under grave threat. 
**** Insert “ex7.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 7: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, No. 7, 
mm. 19–25.” ****  
Before Béatrice’s aria, G minor is presented more openly than in No. 4, but always as an 
“unrealistic” possibility, and one which is quickly folded back into the prevailing tonal order. 
Bénédict’s misogynistic speech in the No. 5 trio is bookended by G minor articulations, first 
in mm. 78–82 and then in m. 257, where the B♭ at the start of the bar is converted to an A♯ at 
the end, to lead to the “proper” B♮ of the G major chord in m. 258 (violin II). B♭ here 
therefore functions precisely like the A♯ in No. 4. The fugal “epithalame grotesque,” No. 6, 
despite being in F tends to prefer G major, II, to the more normal G minor, ii, for pre-
dominant motions (though there are around half a dozen passing G-minor chords in the 
number). In Bénédict’s G-major aria of interpellation, “Ah! je vais l’aimer,” G minor is 
predictably and significantly absent, and as in No. 4, reduced from autonomy to subservience 
by passages such as that in mm. 19–25 (see Example 7), in which first two interrupted 
cadences (onto E minor and F sharp minor) and then one perfect cadence (into G) are 
presented in such a way that by the third iteration of the rising semitone figure the A♯ can 
only be heard as a decoration: like the F♯ of m. 21 and G♯ of m. 23, listeners unquestioningly 
accept that the sonority it tops on the downbeat of m. 25 is “dissonant,” even though it is a 
perfectly viable chord, if it were re-quilted—and so, very subtly, the idea of G minor as a 
realistic possibility for tonal presentation is brushed under the carpet by Bénédict’s euphoric 
G-major vision of his future married happiness, and we are manipulated, perhaps, to join him 
in it. (To ensure that the effect is successful, this passage is repeated in mm. 93–9.) 
But the same cannot be said for Béatrice, whose response to her own tricking into love, her 
aria No. 10 which for Haar “balances” Bénédict’s,101 is a breathtakingly violent rejection not 
only of this kind of mystified ideological maneuvering but also of the idea that, for human 
subjects, identification—specifically, for her, as a married woman, but true also in a general 
sense—is a positive experience. Example 8 shows a middleground graph of the aria, which is 
ostensibly in E♭, a key with a hexatonic relation to the key of marriage, G major, and 
therefore one which, before anything else happens in the music, is able to effect an 
“obliteration” of the tonic by avoiding the dialectical relation between tonic and dominant 
which gives tonality its forceful coherence.102 But it is the hexatonic relation between E♭ and 
G minor that Berlioz fixes at the center of this structure, as little by little Béatrice reveals that, 
far from acquiescing as Bénédict does to the prospect of marriage, in the light of the 
knowledge that he loves her and that she must confess that she loves him, her resolve against 
marriage, symbolized by her unique sustaining of G minor, is hardened at the very moment 
that she opens herself to love. 
**** Insert “ex8.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 8: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, “Dieu! 
que viens-je d’entendre,” middleground graph.” **** 
**** Insert “fig1.png” around here. Caption: “Figure 1: Rabbit–duck illusion, Fliegende 
Blätte, 23 October, 1892, p. 147. The caption reads “Which animals resemble each other the 
most? Rabbit and duck.” ****  
The aria evinces an astonishing disregard for tonal order, in effect presenting an endless 
flickering between E♭ and G minor that bears comparison to the effect of the famous duck–
rabbit image that Wittgenstein used to describe different ways of seeing (see Figure 1). In a 
sense, this is Berlioz’s most elaborate and violent “pun,” in this case on the opera’s keynote, 
G. I have already drawn attention to Béatrice’s tendency to veer off-key in No. 4, but now she 
goes to extremes. Although the aria eventually resolves its very Berliozian ^5-line to a 
satisfactory close in m. 265, and its twice-heard principal lyric melody (that beginning at mm. 
54 and 125) achieves an unflurried I–III–V–I arpeggiation of the tonic (closing into mm. 73 
and 145), such orthodox tonal function is assiduously undermined throughout. Right from the 
start, the tonic E♭ is subjected to retrospective redefinition as ♭VI, leading to a perfect 
cadence in G minor (m. 40); but the G-minor chord thus reached is immediately requilted as 
III/E♭, and a skip of a third to B♭ enables a root-position perfect cadence into E♭ for the first 
statement of the principal melody at m. 54. This alternation of perfect cadences, each 
resolution being immediately reinterpreted as pre-cadential material for the next, is repeated 
throughout the entire aria. Arrows in the graph indicate the twelve root-position perfect-
cadence resolutions into either E♭ or G minor that come before the final closure of the Ursatz 
in m. 265. So habitual does this bass motion become that even when, as Béatrice calls herself 
to “come” and “embrace [her] slavery” (“Viens, […] devant de l’esclavage”) at m. 175, the 
E♭–D–G motion is propulsively continued despite the fact that it is not a cadence into G 
minor but into E♭ that is effected here. Were it not for that cadence—which “should” have 
been G minor according both to the established pattern of the aria and the bass line at this 
point—and the cadences in the repeated lyrical section and the close, E♭ and G minor would 
have six root-position perfect cadences apiece; but even given the slight favoring of E♭ here, 
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the sense in which the tonic duck has shaded into the nontonic rabbit is so strong that, at the 
end, it is merely force of will that holds the tonic in place. Far from presenting itself as a 
“natural” order, the very unnaturalness of tonality, its insistence on violently imposed order 
without reference to anything but its own great power to resolve difference into unity, is 
ruthlessly presented here. And in a concluding touch, the inseparability of G minor and E♭ is 
cemented by a witty little gesture: the final “cadence” is simply a motion from G minor to E♭ 
(mm. 276–7). 
The text reveals the significance of this excessive symbolic violence. Béatrice first presents G 
minor, at m. 40, as she sings of “a hidden fire spreading through [her] breast” (“Je sens un feu 
secret dans mon sein se répandre”), and she returns to E♭ at m. 54 to sing “it comes back to 
me” (“il m’en souvient”)—a dream of Bénédict going away with the army, which made her 
feel anxious for his wellbeing.103 G minor returns, m. 113, as she sings “when I woke at last I 
laughed at my turmoil” (“en m’éveillant enfin je ris de mon émoi”): he was not, as she had 
dreamed, killed in war, but alive—and she now knows what this means. She loves him, and 
sings so in m. 160, as she returns to G minor after the briefest E♭ tonicization of the aria. “I 
am no longer myself” (“je ne suis plus moi-même”), she sings to an E♭ cadence in m. 166, 
and her new identity is presented to her at the next root-position E♭ cadence, m. 188: she now 
flies to face a new slavery (“ce cœur sauvage vole au devant de l’esclavage”). Twice more 
she sings “I love you” to G-minor cadences, and bids the key farewell along with happiness 
and freedom, the losses that every woman must bear in marriage, and the disdain, jests, and 
savage mockery that specifically characterize her relationship with Bénédict (“frivole gaieté, 
[…] liberté, […] dédains, […] folies, […] mordantes railleries”). This latter is the really 
significant privation, since without it their relationship is an empty shell, a sterile and polite 
copybook version of a generalized kind of marital love. Rushton is eloquent here:  
She bids farewell to liberty; the musical language comes close at times to that of 
the despairing Cassandra (“Non, je ne verrai pas,” Les troyens, no. 10). […] The 
aria, therefore, is far from settling the issue for Beatrice. Her sentiments, 
mingling love and pain—hastening to slavery, falling victim to love—would, if 
expressed by the Benedick of the Rondo, be merely a jest, but for Beatrice they 
are real. If the world must be peopled, the burden falls on the woman.104  
Shakespeare’s Beatrice only bids to “contempt, farewell; and maiden pride, adieu” (3.1.109), 
and in “bind[ing] our loves up in a holy band” (3.1.114) she stands to gain “glory” and 
“love.” In Berlioz the stakes are higher. Beatrice stands to lose negative attributes, Béatrice 
positive ones; and while Beatrice can happily list items on the credit side, Béatrice never once 
sings of gaining anything: for her, the effects of interpellation, of accepting a symbolic 
mandate, are entirely destructive, a symbolic “castration,” to use Lacan’s term. And so in this 
aria she will neither accept a mandate nor allow one to present itself as a serious claim on her. 
The structure of her aria shows that it is only random systemic violence that holds tonality—
and by extension all symbolic identifications—in place at all. The final gesture undermines 
the “victory” of E♭; her final claim is that any future resolution in this opera will be an 
autocratic imposition of a quilting point. The profound intervention that Béatrice makes into 
the ideological space of the opera—and of the story, since she goes further than 
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Shakespeare’s comic heroine—is brought into sharper focus if she is compared to her friend. 
Were she Héro, Béatrice would simply turn the painful foreknowledge of the reality of 
marriage into pleasure, by letting the fundamental fantasy provide the minimal support for her 
being, patior, ergo sum, and she would follow the command to “Enjoy!”. But instead she 
takes the radical step of accepting that her subjectivity is founded on a void, and furthermore 
that the big Other of symbolic order, the powerfully centered tonal system, is likewise 
grounded on an abyss of meaninglessness that is merely masquerading as comprehensibility. 
Shakespeare’s Beatrice resists her symbolic mandate until the point that she confesses her 
love; Berlioz’s Béatrice resists it even in and beyond that moment. Her message is: “tonality 
is very strong, but it is arbitrary too: its rules could be equally well applied in other directions 
than those it chooses to privilege, with equal arbitrariness. There is no consistency to the 
outward show of stability. There is no tonal big Other.” This aria, therefore, more than 
anything even in Tristan, which relies in each moment on a single tonic goal to which desire 
can be directed, is an “emancipatory,” “revolutionary” tonal design which sets the musical 
parameters for a love beyond interpellation. Rather than Wagner’s unfulfilled dream of a 
unity of his lovers, Berlioz presents a vision of perpetual war.  
**** Insert “ex9.pdf” around here. Caption: “Example 9: Berlioz, Béatrice et Bénédict, Trio, 
No. 11, mm. 48–56.” ****  
In the following trio, No. 11, Béatrice returns to G minor, the oppositional key which she 
alone can successfully wield in this opera, to sing that she would rather see her best days 
wither in a convent than meekly to drag the chains of (marital) slavery (“de l’esclavage, 
traîner la chaîne en frémissant? Ah! j’aime mieux dans un couvent voir se flétrir la fleur de 
mon bel âge”). Once again she links G minor and E♭, but this she time completes their 
hexatonic relation to marriage’s G major, this movement’s tonic (see Example 9). The 
symbolic consistency of tonal space is, if she is to have her way, obliterated. As she reminds 
us of the terms of her hysterical resistance to identification, Héro and Ursule turn to 
masochistic luxuriation in it, with the fantasy of boredom, jealousy, and betrayal that I 
mentioned in the discussion of Héro, above. The “Enseigne” asserts the big Other’s verdict on 
opposition to marriage by mocking the dissident who joked that if he ever turned Winston 
Smith his friends should hold up a sign to “Benedick, the married man.” The joke bites, but it 
draws blood from the wrong target. Bénédict gave in long ago, but Béatrice is fighting to the 
end. In the opera’s finale, she carries Bénédict and the crowd with her. The crowd 
immediately universalizes the excessive love of this comic duo—and so, potentially, does the 
opera’s audience, too. There is no question of the genuineness of Béatrice’s and Bénédict’s 
love: it is massive and unrestrained by their former denial. But it is not a love that is tied to 
conventional marriage, despite appearances. The G major we hear for one last time, setting 
the strains of the overture with which it all began, is not the same G major any more. It has 
been re-quilted. Béatrice has “frighted the word out of his right sense, so forcible is [her] 
wit.” G major, G minor, E♭: it’s all one, all alike a fake, none of it with any power to prevent 
her traversal of the fundamental fantasy. 
Now, at last, Béatrice et Bénédict’s final paean to “demain” gives up its meaning, which we 
can understand as Berlioz’s final idea of love. This “idea” is, in short, an expression of the 
“truth” of love as the Real of the situation, Platonic in a strong sense. Everything that features 
in reality—which includes traditional and nontraditional forms of marriage—is Symbolic, 
constructed by language, which can never escape ideology. But beyond the Symbolic, and 
terrifyingly pressing onto it, is something that can’t be symbolized, a Real that is the locus of 
truth. Berlioz’s “idea” of love is not coherent in the same way that traditional or 
nontraditional conceptions of marriage, for instance, are coherent as ideas—but that is 
precisely the point, and the source of its value. Coherence belongs to the Symbolic, 
incoherence—a refusal to cohere, to give in to symbolic efficiency, to graspable 
understanding—to the Real. The kind of love that can form a new world cannot be 
accommodated to the rational terms of the existing world, and its interaction with those 
logical expressions—such as this opera’s G major associative tonality for marriage—is 
perpetually, irresolvably antagonistic, destructive, naggingly irrational.  
The “truce” that Béatrice and Bénédict call is, therefore, a momentary, fake submission to the 
fundamental fantasy as it is embodied musically by the resolution to the work’s tonic, G 
major, which stands for the symbolic consistency that tonality blithely promises us. Perhaps it 
is for the sake of their friends Héro and Claudio, who submit so willingly to what Léonato 
calls the “fantasy” of marriage; perhaps it is for the post-Bovary audience, determined to 
cherish the very merest sign that the old fantasmatic order has been restored. But ultimately 
the truce will fail and they will return to war: they reject the big Other’s promise of a life of 
symbolic fullness in preference for an unscripted but emancipated life “beyond 
interpellation.” They know that love is not a submission to society: it is a struggle to escape it. 
Already in Roméo et Juliette Berlioz had enabled Shakespeare’s lovers to achieve their escape 
from symbolic order, albeit briefly, simply by dispensing with words; here, with words 
restored—albeit Berlioz’s own—the victory is the greater. But the struggle is unending. 
Unpicking the military metaphors of Much Ado, Nuttall reminds us that “Ovid wrote, Militiae 
species amor est, ‘Love is a kind of military service’ (Ars amatoria, ii.233), and Militat omnis 
amans, ‘Every lover is a soldier’ (Amores, I.ix.1), but those were jokes.”105 Berlioz’s idea of 
love began in the realm of the fantastic, was projected onto the universal, and maintained a 
potential to be bigger than any world that tried to rein it in. In the culminating moments of his 
last work, Berlioz made a glorious final statement on the issue: he radicalized Ovid’s jokes to 
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